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COMMENT
A Great Writ Reduced: Why the Tenth Circuit’s
Interpretation of Congressional Intent and Supreme Court
Precedent Portends Defeat for State Prisoners Seeking
Federal Habeas Corpus Relief *
I. Introduction
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)1 and transformed both the statutory and conceptual world of federal
habeas corpus. Courts’ efforts to interpret AEDPA have been “groping,
lurching, muzzy, trying with exquisite concentration to make sense of utter
incoherence.”2 Section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, which outlines the method that
federal habeas courts must use in adjudicating legal claims that state courts have
previously denied on the merits, appears to have sparked the most heated battle
and prolonged confusion.3 Section 2254(d)(1) states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . .
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

* Winner, 2004-2005 Gene and Jo Ann Sharp Outstanding Comment Award. The author
would like to thank Professor Mary Margaret Penrose, the Honorable Valerie K. Couch, and the
Honorable Arlene Johnson for their advice and unfailing support throughout her law school
career. The author would also like to thank her family for providing a setting in which the law
exists in concordance with the arts, the humanities, and four constant champions who would
never allow anyone to sit in the veriest back.
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-2266 (Supp. 1997) and
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
2. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreword to RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at v (4th ed. 2001).
3. Indeed, one view is that this “oddly drafted statute has no plain meaning.” Note,
Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1876 (1997); see also Robert D. Sloane, AEDPA’s
“Adjudication on the Merits” Requirement: Collateral Review, Federalism, and Comity, 78 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 615, 646 (2004) (“The text of § 2254(d) therefore does not admit of a single
‘plain meaning.’ Its meaning depends in the first instance on which canons of statutory
construction a court elects to apply and which to ignore.”).
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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .4
Though the word “deference” does not appear in the statute, Congress clearly
intended to prescribe deferential behavior for the federal courts because federal
courts may no longer “grant habeas relief based solely on [their] independent
interpretation and application of federal law.” 5
Although all federal courts must apply the standard imparted by § 2254(d)(1)
of AEDPA when reviewing state prisoners’ habeas petitions, 6 the manner in
which a court of appeals applies this section is especially significant for a state
prisoner. If a court of appeals denies relief, only the U.S. Supreme Court can
provide the prisoner reprieve, and the Supreme Court is historically reticent to
grant certiorari to review federal habeas claims. 7 This reticence was especially
notable under the direction of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 8 Thus, defense attorneys
and pro se prisoners understandably may be dismayed at having to allege that
a state court’s adjudication was contrary to federal precedent or involved an
unreasonable application of federal law. This pessimism is compounded when
a prisoner’s application is made to a court of appeals, as this realistically may
be the prisoner’s final chance at obtaining relief.
In certain cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
has granted limited or full habeas relief to a state prisoner, even though the state
courts, and usually the district court as well, have denied such relief.9 This
comment examines the Tenth Circuit’s treatment of § 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA in
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and in cases where the circuit court
has extended habeas relief to prisoners over the denial of the state courts. The
limited number of cases where this has occurred, combined with the Tenth
Circuit’s rationale in these opinions, indicate that the Tenth Circuit is indeed
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
5. Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L.
REV. 1493, 1495 (2001); see also 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 1419-21; Monique
Anne Gaylor, Note, Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State
Court Decisions, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2003).
6. The 1996 amendments are applicable only to postconviction-relief petitions filed after
April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997).
7. See John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 273 (1996); Yale L. Rosenberg, Constricting
Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
597, 597 (1985); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 993-94
(1985) [hereinafter Yackle, Explaining].
8. See Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Reform of Habeas Corpus: The Advocates’ Lament,
44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 47 (1996).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
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following Congress’s plan for restricted habeas relief, as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court. This comment also notes commonalities among these Tenth
Circuit opinions to provide guidance to the judiciary, as well as to state
prisoners and their counsel, in determining whether the Tenth Circuit will likely
grant the prisoner habeas relief.
Part II of this comment examines the writ of habeas corpus, both pre- and
post-AEDPA, as well as the congressional purposes behind the passage of
AEDPA and the adoption of the standard in § 2254(d)(1). Part III provides an
overview of Supreme Court cases that shaped the application of § 2254(d)(1)
and the implications of the Supreme Court’s holdings for this provision. Part
IV considers cases in which the Tenth Circuit, applying § 2254(d)(1), granted
some form of habeas relief to a state prisoner on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and analyzes the rationale the court provided in each. Part
V submits that the Tenth Circuit is following the congressional habeas scheme
and the Supreme Court’s precedent of limiting habeas availability. Part V
further considers judicial and legislative policy issues at stake, the Tenth
Circuit’s concerns regarding § 2254(d)(1), and the state of AEDPA and habeas
jurisprudence today. This analysis provides both a forecast regarding the
likelihood of success of habeas petitions in the Tenth Circuit and guidance for
other circuits as they unravel the intricacies of AEDPA.
II. A Great Writ Slenderized: How Habeas May Work for You
A. The Long and Winding Road — to Relief, or at Least a Hearing
Of the various state and federal procedures of post-appeal challenges
generally termed “collateral remedies,” the one collateral remedy available to
all state prisoners is the writ of federal habeas corpus.10 The writ of habeas
corpus does not focus on the merits of the petitioner’s claim — innocence or
guilt is not being relitigated — but rather evaluates whether a state is
unlawfully holding a prisoner in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 11 Even
before the enactment of AEDPA, the U.S. Supreme Court referred to the role
10. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.1 (3d ed. 2000). The common
law writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis provided the origin of most common collateral
remedies available today. Id. Coram nobis (“before us”) was “[a] writ of error directed to a
court for review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of facts,” while habeas
corpus (“that you have the body”) was, and is, a writ used “to bring a person before a court,
most frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 362, 728 (8th ed. 2004).
11. This does not mean that any constitutional violation will assure a prisoner’s release.
“[T]he Court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need
to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.”
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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of federal habeas proceedings as “secondary” and “limited.” 12 The Court
emphasized that litigants should not use federal courts to relitigate state trials
or to delay an execution in a death penalty case indefinitely because direct
appeal is the primary route for review, and courts give a presumption of finality
and legality to the end result of the state court appeals process.13
Habeas corpus was historically characterized as the “Great Writ of Liberty”
and was an alleged procedural underpinning of the Magna Charta’s guarantee
of due process. 14 The doctrine shed its English crown with limited presence in
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Later, Congress’s Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
broadened habeas corpus such that federal courts could grant writs when any
person was held “in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States.” 15 In addition, Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution explicitly
grants the privilege of habeas corpus, stating: “The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”16
Habeas corpus relief became a significant possibility for state prisoners in
1953 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen. 17 Although the
scope of the writ had previously been narrowly focused on jurisdictional error,18
since Brown, the alleged violation of a constitutional right has become
cognizable in a federal habeas action. 19 In addition, after Brown, the Supreme
Court allowed independent review of state-court adjudications of federal
constitutional law issues, even if the state court’s treatment was “full and fair.”20
Brown’s holding meant that federal courts gave no deference to the state courts’
legal determinations.21 Instead, Brown required federal courts to review all of
12. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 887 (1983)).
13. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 887-88.
14. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 28.1.
15. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
17. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 273. See generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.2 (4th ed. 2003) (providing an overview of habeas
corpus development in the United States).
18. Fred Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation in Relation to Prisoner Population,
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), Sept. 1998, at 2
[hereinafter Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation].
19. Brown, 344 U.S. at 486; Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 273.
20. Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 273. Brown also dictated that a federal court must
hold a hearing to address questions of fact if there are “unusual circumstances.” 344 U.S. at
463.
21. The former § 2254(d) stated:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
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a petitioner’s legal claims essentially “from scratch” — a de novo review
independent of the state courts’ adjudication of the same claims. 22 Basically,
Brown allowed federal courts to disregard state courts’ legal conclusions and
reach independent judgments on the issues presented.23
From a prisoner’s perspective, Brown presaged a “Golden Age” of federal
habeas jurisprudence. 24 A decade after Brown, a series of decisions by the
Supreme Court granted the district courts a greater role in reviewing state court
decisions and removed many procedural barriers to habeas relief.25 After these
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit— (1) that the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that the factfinding procedure
employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3)
that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding; (5) that the applicant was an
indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to
appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding; (6) that the
applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in
the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the record of the State court
proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent
to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual
determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on
a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record: And in an evidentiary hearing
in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual
determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the
circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive,
is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or
unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8)
that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly
support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to
establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court
was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 1997).
22. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 1419. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,
287-88 (1992); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995).
23. Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 96
F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)).
24. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1497, 1499 n.25.
25. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). These three cases were ultimately superseded by
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cases, the district courts replaced the Supreme Court as the “principal means
through which the federal judiciary exercised authority over the state criminal
process.” 26 These pro-defendant decisions led first to an increase in the volume
of habeas petitions,27 and then, in the 1970s, to a decline in federal petitions
while state courts improved their own capacity to apply constitutional standards
to habeas claims.28 In the 1980s and early 1990s, federal habeas petitions
increased once again,29 despite the growing constrictions by the Rehnquist
court,30 which were curtailing the availability of the writ with procedural
hurdles and limitations on when federal courts could hear state prisoners’
claims. 31 Decisions of this period resurrected many of the barriers the Court
had eliminated in the era following Brown.32
By 1989, the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane 33 settled on a more narrow
rule for federal habeas courts to follow than the de novo standard of review in
Brown.34 In Teague, the Court concluded that federal habeas courts should not
focus on how they would interpret the Constitution, but instead should examine
whether the state court’s interpretation reasonably applied binding precedent to
the direct review of the prisoner’s conviction.35 Even if a federal court would
AEDPA.
26. Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation, supra note 18, at 2 (quoting Daniel J. Meador,
Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273, 273 (1983)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Mark R. Barr, Survey, The Not-So-Great Writ: An Analysis of Recent Tenth Circuit
Decisions Reflecting the Current Difficulty in Obtaining Habeas Corpus Relief for State
Prisoners, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 497, 499 (2003).
31. William P. Welty, Comment, “Adjudication on the Merits” Under the AEDPA, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 900, 902 (2003); Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1731, 1734-48 (2000) [hereinafter Yackle, Figure]. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane,
Judicial Activism and Legislative “Reform” of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of
Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1991), for a discussion of the
“devolution” of habeas corpus after Rehnquist’s accession to the bench in 1976. See also
Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute
Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1477, 1492 (1996) (“[In the 1980s and
1990s] the Supreme Court turned habeas corpus into only a shadow of its former self.”).
32. Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 96 MICH. L. REV. 434, 436 (1997). These procedural hurdles include
stricter standards for harmless-error analysis and development of material facts during state
proceedings. Id. at 436 n.25.
33. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
34. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
35. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-08. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1953), for
the Supreme Court’s holding that federal habeas courts are not bound by state courts’
interpretation of the Constitution. Teague narrowed the federal courts’ “final say” and §
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have reached the opposite conclusion on a point of constitutional law, it was
still bound to affirm the state court’s decision as long as the state court’s
decision applied precedent reasonably. 36 In effect, the Teague Court
circumscribed federal courts’ review by implementing the “reasonably applied
precedent” standard.37 Therefore, most habeas appeals cases did not contribute
to the development of criminal law.38
Clearly, the Court has not “always followed an unwavering line in its
conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. [Its] development of the
law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seemingly, with some backing
and filling.” 39 Because of the Court’s nonlinear development of habeas
jurisprudence, federal habeas corpus relief has long been difficult for
practitioners, prisoners, and courts to understand. 40 Also, since Teague, the
Supreme Court has effectively limited the reach of habeas relief based on many
policy concerns, including federalism issues and ensuring the finality of
convictions. 41 Therefore, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief faces
both procedural battles in requesting such relief and long-standing attitudinal
battles in getting such relief granted.42
B. AEDPA Emerges
Habeas review was quite limited in scope by the time of AEDPA’s
enactment in 1996.43 A major purpose for Congress’s passage of AEDPA “was

2254(d) has narrowed it still more, but AEDPA did not overrule Teague’s main holding — that
new rules of criminal procedure are not applicable to finalized cases. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
Courts must still conduct a Teague retroactivity analysis as a threshold matter alongside any
AEDPA analysis. See, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002).
36. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992).
37. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308.
38. Note, supra note 3, at 1870.
39. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1963)).
40. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, § 15.1 (discussing the uses of and debates
surrounding federal habeas corpus).
41. Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 273-74.
42. Indeed, one position is that judges’ aversion to increasing the availability of habeas
relief is so strong that a state prisoner’s attorney can maximize his chances for relief by drawing
on a “bolt-hole theory of the case: a narrow argument through which [the prisoner] can be
slipped away to freedom, with a door somewhere in the passageway that can be slammed shut
in the faces of all other prisoners seeking to follow.” Amsterdam, supra note 2, at ix. In other
words, the bias against granting habeas relief means that a lawyer needs to present the
petitioner’s case so that relief would be specific only to that case, to “minimize the potential
precedential effect of winning.” Id. at xi. “Unless the judge is satisfied that s/he can give relief
in [the attorney’s] case with no (or very little) prospect that other accused or convicted persons
will escape punishment,” the judge will not grant habeas relief. Id. at x.
43. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
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a desire to limit federal review to legal precepts that were binding on the state
courts when they ruled, and to keep federal courts from applying precepts of
their own recent invention.” 44 AEDPA phrased this as a negative limitation on
federal courts’ power, granting no relief “unless” the decision was “contrary to”
or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law. 45 Section
2254(d) of AEDPA now governs habeas review, the area previously covered
by Brown,46 Teague,47 and Teague’s progeny.48
The motivation behind the passage of AEDPA is important in understanding
the rationale and effect of § 2254(d)(1), the current congressional scheme for
habeas review, and whether courts such as the Tenth Circuit are complying with
Congress’s wishes. The passage of AEDPA, the most significant habeas reform
since 1867,49 came at a tempestuous time in American history, in the wake of
outrage over the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 50 and the prolonged litigation
following the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in
1988. 51 As for domestic terrorism, AEDPA demonstrated President Clinton’s
2254-2255, 2261-2266 (Supp. 1997) and scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
44. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1432 n.11.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). For further description of these standards, see infra
Parts II.C & III.
46. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
47. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
48. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381,
382-83 (1996) [hereinafter Yackle, Primer].
49. Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong
with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001).
50. See Khandelwal, supra note 32, at 437.
51. AEDPA, in effect, allowed civil jurisdiction for U.S. citizens’ claims against Libya in
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7); this section created an exception to the general immunity granted
foreign jurisdictions for damage actions for personal injury or death resulting from aircraft
sabotage. Because Libya was already on the U.S. Department of State’s list of state sponsors
of terrorism when AEDPA was passed, jurisdiction over Libya “existed the moment that the
AEDPA amendment became law” without any separate decision by the Secretary of State
needed. Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000) reads in pertinent part:
XXx(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case—
XXx(7) . . . in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources
(as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of
material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency,
except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph—
XXx(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
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tough stance on crime as he faced reelection 52 and appealed to the public’s wish
to prevent federal courts from releasing criminals and terrorists, such as
Timothy McVeigh, on the basis of their alternative adjudication of legal
issues. 53 AEDPA was an effort “to legislatively follow in the Rehnquist Court’s
judicial footsteps” by limiting the availability of habeas relief. 54 The public
stirred Congress to action with its frustration over the high reversal rate of death
sentences and slow pace of executions.55 This heightened fear and awareness
culminated in what has been called
a passion-fueled, extreme, and not well thought-out form of habeas
corpus bashing. It overshot by a considerable margin the habeascurbing doctrines that the Supreme Court had been developing
progressively though controversially case-by-case since the mid
1980’s. . . . In short, even more than the Rehnquistian habeas agenda
that preceded AEDPA, AEDPA itself was fated to arouse polarized
judicial reactions: love, loathing, and very little in between.56
Neither the intense controversy over habeas corpus nor legislators’ high
hopes for reducing habeas litigation has diminished since AEDPA took effect,
although reviews of the statute have been mixed.57 The enactment of AEDPA
led to changes for numerous aspects of the statutory federal habeas system,
including strict filing deadlines, a requirement for exhaustion of state remedies
before filing a petition in federal court, the curtailment of state prisoners’ ability
to obtain evidentiary hearings, and limits on appellate review and successive
federal petitions.58 Specifically, AEDPA established a one-year statute of
2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371)
at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act[.]
Id.
52. Williams, supra note 49, at 923; see also Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New
Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 136 (1998) (“Of
course, the AEDPA largely owes its existence to long-standing Republican dissatisfaction with
lower federal courts’ general treatment of habeas petitions from state prisoners.”).
53. President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996); see also 142 CONG. REC.
S3362 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I have to say one of the biggest
problems [is] loony judges in the Federal courts who basically will grant a habeas corpus
petition for any reason at all.”).
54. Welty, supra note 31, at 902-03.
55. Williams, supra note 49, at 923.
56. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at vi. Comment from the prosecution’s side of the field,
naturally, has been more positive. See, e.g., infra note 65.
57. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
58. Yackle, Primer, supra note 48, at 386-97; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, §
15.4.3.
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limitations to file a federal habeas corpus provision for both federal and state
inmates, beginning when the inmate exhausts all direct appeals.59 AEDPA also
requires that a panel of the applicable court of appeals approve the filing of
successive habeas corpus petitions in district court60 and prohibits claims that
were presented in an earlier habeas application from being repeated in a
subsequent petition.61
Congress designed these mechanisms to assist with AEDPA’s stated purpose
of ending prolonged habeas litigation in capital cases.62 Before AEDPA’s
passage, numerous attorneys, scholars, judicial committees, and judges had
criticized the federal habeas system on account of overloaded federal dockets,
delay because of frivolous claims, and a disruption of comity among the federal
and state courts. 63 Additional reasons for enacting AEDPA included the
following: (1) to restrain the federal courts’ ability to review death sentences in
the midst of these courts’ overturning of death row inmates’ convictions and
capital sentences;64 (2) to increase the deterrent effect of those death sentences
and provide assistance to victims’ families;65 and (3) in the words of AEDPA
itself, “to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective
death penalty, and for other purposes.” 66 As finding fault with deterring
terrorism and providing justice is difficult, and not having controversy over
capital punishment is impossible, these “other purposes” have sparked
controversy in the debate over the doctrine of federal habeas relief and its role
in the American judicial system.67

59. Fred Cheesman, II et al., A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas
Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 LAW & POL’Y 89, 95 (2000) [hereinafter
Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws].
60. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000, at 4 (2002) [hereinafter BJS SPECIAL
REPORT].
61. Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 95.
62. Williams, supra note 49, at 923.
63. Note, supra note 3, at 1878.
64. Yackle, Figure, supra note 31, at 1734.
65. Protecting the Innocent: Ensuring Competent Counsel in Death Penalty Cases:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 485 (June 27, 2001) (statement of
Bill Pryor, Attorney General of the State of Alabama) (“In 1996, Congress wisely concluded
that the Federal process for review of death sentences should accord deference to State courts
and be streamlined to make capital punishment a more effective deterrent of heinous crimes and
a better system of justice for the innocent families of victims of capital murder.”).
66. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1214 (1996).
67. Indeed, one commentator remarked that the law should be entitled “[T]he AntiTerrorism and Anti-Habeas Corpus Act of 1996.” Tabak, supra note 31, at 1477.
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C. What It Takes for Habeas to Happen Under AEDPA
Although AEDPA played an important role in modifying the federal habeas
structural scheme, the statute’s specific requirements also set forth new
procedural steps that a state prisoner must fulfill to assert his claim.
Procedurally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 68 regulate federal habeas
corpus. State courts have the power to evaluate the constitutionality of state
criminal prosecutions, including any federal issues that arise in those
prosecutions.69 These state courts’ legal determinations are then entitled to
finality absent a violation of either § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable” or “contrary
to” standard or of another AEDPA provision. 70 Individuals who have been
convicted by jury trial of a serious offense file the majority of habeas
petitions.71 The state prisoner will face opposition from the state’s Attorney
General, who generally represents the state when the state prisoner claims his
federal constitutional rights were violated in state criminal proceedings. 72 If a
federal district court denies a state prisoner’s petition, the prisoner may present
the habeas corpus petition to a court of appeals for consideration.73
68. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS. There are, however, differences between habeas cases and other civil
actions, including the use of fact-based rather than notice-based pleading. See Blume & Voisin,
supra note 7, at 277.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (stating that “[u]pon
the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and
protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States”); see also
Yackle, Explaining, supra note 7, at 992.
70. Violations other than under § 2254(d)(1) are outside the scope of this comment.
71. Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court
Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 242-44 (1995). Because of the lengthy procedural steps
(for example, exhaustion of state remedies) required before filing a habeas petition, a longer
sentence, as might be expected for a conviction of a serious offense by jury trial, is necessarily
prerequisite to petitioning for relief. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
73. The courts of appeals system is fairly simple:
The federal courts of appeals are the intermediate appellate courts between the
district (trial) courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. There are
thirteen courts of appeals: eleven numbered circuits (First through Eleventh), the
District of Columbia Circuit, and the Federal Circuit. The numbered circuits,
including the Tenth Circuit, provide appellate review of all cases tried in the
district courts within the geographic area of their jurisdiction; they also decide
appeals brought to them by residents of the circuit from various administrative
tribunals, including the Tax Court and agencies of the federal government. The
territorial jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit includes the six states of Oklahoma,
Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, plus those portions of the
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Sections 2241 through 2254 of AEDPA outline the facets of federal habeas
relief, including the federal courts’ power to grant the writ, finality of the
federal courts’ determination, and review and appeal of federal habeas orders.74
A petition for habeas relief filed on § 2254(d)(1) grounds — a claim that relief
is warranted because the case’s adjudication involved a decision that was
“contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law” — also must meet the other criteria outlined in § 2254.75 Under § 2254,
a federal court will only consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus if
the state prisoner is (1) in custody76 and (2) being held in violation of federal
law. 77 In addition, courts can only grant a writ of habeas corpus when the
applicant has exhausted all available state remedies, when no state corrective
process is available, or when the state corrective process is ineffective in
protecting the applicant’s rights.78 Even if the applicant has not exhausted
available state remedies, a federal court may deny the application on the merits;
only the state can expressly waive the exhaustion requirement.79 If a petitioner
still has the right to raise the question presented by any existing state procedure,
he or she has not exhausted available state remedies.80
Yellowstone National Park extending into Montana and Idaho.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Who We Are, at http://www.ck10.uscourts.gov/
info.cfm?part=4 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (stating that the courts
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts).
74. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254. A federal prisoner claiming the right to be released because
(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2)
the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. Id.
§ 2255.
75. Id. § 2254.
76. Id. § 2254(a). See id. § 2241(c) for further description of the “in custody” requirement.
See also infra Part IV (discussing Holmes v. McKune, No. 01-3004, 2003 WL 220496 (10th Cir.
Jan. 31, 2003) (unpub. op.), in which a habeas petitioner released on parole was held to be “in
custody” for federal habeas review purposes).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Not all federal claims are cognizable for habeas purposes,
however. On account of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), a habeas petitioner generally
cannot raise an assertion of illegal search and seizure grounded in the Fourth Amendment unless
the state courts failed to provide him with a full and fair opportunity to present his claim. See
Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 277 & n.34. However, a petitioner may raise search and
seizure issues if defense counsel failed to object to the denial of a suppression motion.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
79. Id. § 2254(b)(2)-(3).
80. Id. § 2254(c). Although AEDPA is stringent in its treatment of exhaustion, the U.S.
Supreme Court has rejected the argument that AEDPA’s provisions requiring leave from the
court of appeals before filing a second habeas petition in district court violates the Suspension
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Section 2254(d) separates its criteria for grants of habeas relief according to
the type of claim asserted by the prisoner.81 Although § 2254(d)(1) provides a
standard for federal courts to review the state’s legal, and possibly mixed legalfactual, determinations, 82 § 2254(d)(2) provides a standard for reviewing the
state’s factual determinations. Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant
the writ if the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision employing an
“unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” in the
proceeding.83 Sections 2254(e) through 2254(i) of AEDPA require federal
courts to apply a presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination of
factual issues.84 These sections also contain procedural guidelines for federal
courts to apply in determining sufficiency of the evidence and other factual
claims.85 When taken as a whole, § 2254 sets forth specific conditions that state
prisoners must meet to present claims for habeas corpus relief in federal court. 86
Section 2254(d)(1) is an important part of AEDPA because it serves a
“gatekeeper” function, controlling all “error of law” access to federal habeas
review.87 Section 2254(d)(1) modified the previous rule of independent federal
review to curb delays, prevent “retrials” on federal habeas, and give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under the law. 88 Some scholars were
expecting § 2254(d)(1) to greatly restrict habeas availability in light of the
Rehnquistian attitude toward federal habeas relief — even possibly extending
federal court deference to any state’s “reasonable” adjudication of the merits.89
Instead, the § 2254(d)(1) standard expressly focuses on relief for unreasonable
adjudication.90 This seems understandable, as affording complete deference to
any “reasonable” adjudication goes beyond even Teague’s “reasonably applied

Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
81. Before passage of AEDPA, § 2254(d) dictated the standards for the grant of an
evidentiary hearing in habeas proceedings; that section is now re-designated as § 2254(e).
82. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
84. Id. § 2254(e)-(i).
85. Id.
86. Section 2254(d)(1) applies only to state prisoners’ habeas petitions; section 2255, which
governs habeas relief for federal prisoners, does not have a comparable provision. See id. §
2255.
87. Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary
on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 679 (2003).
88. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000); see also Emerson v. Johnson, 243 F.3d
931, 935 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that part of the congressional rationale in passing AEDPA
stemmed from a desire to require habeas petitioners to exhaust their claims in state courts).
89. Yackle, Primer, supra note 48, at 383-84 (citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 287
(1992) (Thomas, J.) (dictum)).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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precedent” standard. 91 Such a standard would so limit relief that its application
could conceivably violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. 92 Notably,
§ 2254(d)(1) only applies to claims adjudicated on the merits by a state court. 93
If a federal court finds that the state court did not adjudicate the claim on the
merits, applied an incorrect legal standard, or rejected the claim on procedural
grounds, the reviewing court reverts to the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of
review for any legal or legal-factual rulings. 94 Considerable controversy
surrounds the designation of “adjudicated on the merits,” as well as the proper
standard of review for a federal court faced with a state court decision that does
not reach the merits of the claim.95
III. Construing AEDPA: Not a Silk Purse to Be Found
Between AEDPA’s inception in 1996 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000
term, the cases decided by the Supreme Court with reference to § 2254(d)(1) of
AEDPA were not terribly instructive in how the federal courts should interpret
this provision.96 The Supreme Court did not establish concrete guidelines
regarding what constituted an “unreasonable application” or whether a holding
that was merely distinguishable from federal precedent was automatically

91. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (stating that Teague “validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts”).
92. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
94. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 1419; see, e.g., Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d
919, 929, 932 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004); Lopez v. Williams, No. 00-2247, 2003 WL 356636, at *3
(10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2003) (unpub. op.); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003);
Ellis v. Mullin, 326 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977 (2003); Scott
v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002); Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1235
(10th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1061-62 (10th Cir. 2001); McGregor v.
Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1302
n.2 (10th Cir. 1999); Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999).
95. Welty, supra note 31, at 902-06. Each circuit has adopted fundamentally similar
definitions, though the Tenth Circuit especially has articulated a literal definition of
“adjudication” that would prescribe deference to all state court decisions. Id. Compare Paine
v. Massie, 339 F.3d 1194, 1998 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a state court resolves a claim in a
summary fashion with little or no reasoning, we owe deference to the state court’s result.”), with
Ides, supra note 87, at 681 (“[T]he phrase ‘adjudication on the merits’ . . . mean[s] that the issue
was presented to the state court and that the state court resolved the claim without reference to
state rules of procedural default.”). See generally Sloane, supra note 3, for an argument that
a summary dismissal of a federal claim by a state appellate court should not be considered an
“adjudication on the merits.” Under AEDPA, federal courts’ review of factual findings now
appears grounded in a reasonableness standard, but their review of legal questions requires some
level of deference to state courts’ rulings. Note, supra note 3, at 1872.
96. Ides, supra note 87, at 679.
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“contrary to” clearly established federal law. Moreover, until 2000, the
Supreme Court failed to define “clearly established” federal law and did not
state whether that phrase refered to any part of a written opinion or just the
holding. The Supreme Court itself admitted the ambiguity of AEDPA: “All we
can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse
of the art of statutory drafting.” 97 As one scholar flatly expressed it, “[t]he new
law is not well drafted.” 98
Federal courts were hard-pressed to grasp Congress’s intent because the
statute failed to clearly define the limitations Congress wanted to place on their
scope of review.99 Courts of appeals interpreted each of § 2254(d)(1)’s prongs
in different ways. For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits created a “reasonable jurist” standard of
“unreasonable application,” which the Supreme Court ultimately rejected in
Williams v. Taylor. 100 Although the language of § 2254(d)(1) seems to discard
the de novo standard of review developed by the Court in Brown v. Allen, 101 it
does not clearly articulate the standard that should replace the de novo
standard.102 Additionally, the language of § 2254(d)(1) does not provide
guidance concerning mixed questions of law and fact. Even after Williams, the
courts of appeals and district courts continue to differ on whether the provisions
of § 2254(d)(1) address such questions, and if so, which provision applies.103
Another unresolved problem arises when state court decisions address only
procedural grounds as a basis for their refusal to grant habeas relief 104 or issue

97. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
98. Yackle, Primer, supra note 48, at 381.
99. Welty, supra note 31, at 903.
100. 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir.
1998) (“[A] federal court may issue habeas relief only if ‘the state courts have decided the
question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists
would all agree is unreasonable.’”)).
101. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
102. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus
. . . shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable interpretation of, clearly established Federal law
. . . .”), with Brown, 344 U.S. at 464-65 (“Although they have the power, it is not necessary for
federal courts to hold hearings . . . when satisfied that federal constitutional rights have been
protected. It is necessary to exercise jurisdiction to the extent of determining by examination
of the record whether or not a hearing would serve the ends of justice.”) (footnote omitted).
Significantly, § 2254(d)(1) does not include a mandate of “deference” anywhere in its text. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 386 (“[I]t is significant that the word ‘deference’ does not appear in the
text of the statute itself”) (Stevens, J., concurring); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3,
at 1433 n.13.
103. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 10, § 28.6(g); see Note, supra note 3, at Part II.A.
104. See Welty, supra note 31, at 904.
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“postcard denials” that do not explicate the grounds upon which they based
their denial of relief. 105 Section 2254(d)(1) applies only after a claim has been
“adjudicated on the merits,” 106 but the circuits are split on whether the presence
of procedural grounds in the court’s decision equates to a lack of adjudication
on the merits.107 According to the approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit, a
decision that fails to articulate its analysis of the federal claim(s) still qualifies
as an adjudication on the merits provided that it does not rest solely on
procedural grounds.108 A court’s reliance on the merits for its holding, even as
an alternative basis, still constitutes an adjudication on the merits in the Tenth
Circuit. 109 Some commentators argue that if the state court fails to convey the
basis for its denial of relief, then the federal habeas court should review the
federal law claims independently, which essentially means that the state court
would lose the deference implied in AEDPA.110 Increasing confusion and
disagreement in the lower federal courts compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to

105. See Steinman, supra note 5, Parts III.B.3 & III.C.2, at 1516-18, 1522-23 (discussing
treatment of an unexplained opinion from both an opinion-deference and a result-deference
standpoint).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
107. Gaylor, supra note 5, at 1269.
108. Id. at 1269-70 (citing Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002));
accord Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that “where there is no
indication suggesting that the state court did not reach the merits of a claim, we have held that
a state court reaches a decision ‘on the merits’ even when it fails either to mention the federal
basis for the claim or cite any state or federal law in support of its conclusion” (citing Aycox
v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999))); Hawkins v. Mullin, 291 F.3d 658, 677 (10th
Cir. 2002) (applying the standard of AEDPA though the state appellate court discussed only
state law); cf. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (applying AEDPA standard to
a claim though the state court did not cite controlling Supreme Court precedent). In
determining the proper standard of review to apply, the Tenth Circuit also compares the
stringency of the state court standard with that of the federal standard. If the appellate court
rejects a habeas claim using a state court standard “that is equally or more favorable to [the
prisoner] relative to the federal standard, the state court’s decision constitutes an adjudication
of the federal claim despite citing no federal decisions.” Harris v. Poppell, 411 F.3d 1189, 1196
(10th Cir. 2005) (citing Packer, 537 U.S. at 9; Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th
Cir. 2001); Upchurch v. Bruce, 333 F.3d 1158, 1164 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003)).
109. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1192.
110. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1495. The Supreme Court’s six-Justice majority analysis
in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), seems to set forth an opinion-oriented deference
rather than a result-oriented deference, given that it examined the reasoning of the state court
and ultimately granted relief based on the state court’s articulation of precedent and its
“unreasonable” application of the precedent to the facts. In addition, the majority rejected Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s approach, which focused on the result reached by the state court. Id. at 41719; see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1427-28, 1448-52; infra Part III.A.
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specifically address the language of § 2254(d)(1) in several decisions,
beginning with Williams, four years after AEDPA took effect.111
A. Williams v. Taylor: A Light at the End of the AEDPA Tunnel
Williams v. Taylor 112 was the seminal case providing guidance for the new
AEDPA standard.113 A jury unanimously sentenced Terry Williams to death
after his trial counsel presented minimal mitigating evidence, chose one of his
witnesses from the audience at the sentencing hearing with no preparatory
discussion, and explained in closing argument that “it was difficult to find a
reason why the jury should spare Williams’ life.” 114 Williams sought state
collateral relief, and the trial judge found that the failure of Williams’s defense
counsel to discover and present significant mitigating evidence during
sentencing 115 violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the
standard implemented by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.116 In
Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for evaluating a
petitioner’s claim alleging that he has been denied his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel. 117 For a court to grant habeas relief, a
convicted defendant must show that the counsel’s representation both “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 118 and was prejudicial to his

111. 529 U.S. 362. This decision was the case of Terry Williams. On the same date, the
Supreme Court addressed AEDPA in the case of Michael Williams in Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 420 (2000), which also was appealed from the Fourth Circuit but involved a different
petitioner.
112. 529 U.S. 362.
113. Gaylor, supra note 5, at 1267.
114. Williams, 529 U.S. at 369. The closing argument included the following:
I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man who
maybe has not shown much mercy himself. I doubt very seriously that he thought
much about mercy . . . . Admittedly it is very difficult to get us and ask that you
give this man mercy when he has shown so little of it himself. But I would ask
that you would.
Id.
115. The Danville Circuit Court found the defense counsel’s failure to discover and present
evidence of Williams’s abuse as a child, borderline mental retardation, possible mental
impairments, and lack of future threat to society was “below the range expected of reasonable,
professional competent assistance of counsel.” Id. at 371.
116. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
117. Id. at 688-89.
118. Showing that counsel’s performance was deficient requires demonstrating that “counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, quoted in Williams, 529 U.S. at 390. To
establish ineffectiveness, “a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688.
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defense.119 Because the trial judge found that Williams’s counsel had been
ineffective, the trial judge made a recommendation that the Virginia Supreme
Court grant Williams a hearing for resentencing.120
Even though the Virginia Supreme Court assumed that trial counsel had been
ineffective,121 it rejected this recommendation 122 because it applied the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel of Lockhart v. Fretwell123 rather than
Strickland. The Virginia Supreme Court’s reading of Lockhart required it to
conduct a separate inquiry into fundamental fairness, even though Williams had
shown that his lawyer’s ineffectiveness probably was prejudicial to his
defense.124 Consequently, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that
introducing the mitigating evidence would not have fundamentally changed the
ultimate sentencing recommendation of the jury, and it denied Williams
relief.125
After Williams exhausted all available state remedies, he sought federal
habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.126 The federal district court agreed with the trial court that
Williams’s sentence of death was constitutionally infirm. 127 The court found
that the failure of Williams’s trial counsel to introduce mitigating evidence was
not a strategic decision and even if it had been, the tactic would not justify the
omission of potentially persuasive evidence. 128 The district judge found a
substantial factual error in the Virginia Supreme Court’s analysis, 129 and the

119. Showing that deficient performance prejudiced the defense requires demonstrating that
“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.” Id. at 687, quoted in Williams, 529 U.S. at 390. To establish prejudice, a defendant
must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
120. Williams, 529 U.S. at 371.
121. Id.
122. Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1997).
123. 506 U.S. 364 (1993). Lockhart held that “given the overriding interest in fundamental
fairness, the likelihood of a different outcome attributable to an incorrect interpretation of the
law should be regarded as a potential ‘windfall’ to the defendant rather than the legitimate
‘prejudice’” contemplated in Strickland. Williams, 529 U.S. at 392. Reading the Lockhart
decision as requiring an additional examination of fundamental fairness in Williams’s claim,
the Virginia Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in relying on mere outcome
determination when gauging prejudice or a lack thereof. Id. at 393, 371.
124. Id. at 393.
125. Id. at 371-72.
126. Id. at 372.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 373.
129. Id. at 373 & n.5.
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federal court also criticized the Virginia Supreme Court’s use of the Lockhart,
rather than the Strickland, standard for determining prejudice.130 As for
prejudicial effect, the district court determined that the behavior of Williams’s
trial counsel met the Strickland criterion: “but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 131 The district
court therefore held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”
within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) under its analysis of that provision.132
In reversing the district court’s grant of habeas relief, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit construed § 2254(d)(1) as prohibiting the grant
of habeas relief unless the state court “decided the question by interpreting or
applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all
agree is unreasonable.” 133 The Fourth Circuit declared that the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of either the
Strickland or Lockhart standards and endorsed the Virginia Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Lockhart.134 Also, the Fourth Circuit determined that the state
court had a “reasonable” understanding of the facts.135
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth
Circuit,136 and in so doing provided significant guidance on the workings of §
130. Id. at 373.
131. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
132. Id. at 374.
133. Id. (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)); see also supra note
100 and accompanying text.
134. Williams, 529 U.S. at 374.
135. Id.
136. Id. Although Justice Stevens’s opinion drew a six-Justice majority as to the application
of § 2254(d)(1) to the facts, the entire decision was a hodgepodge of concurrences and dissents:
Justice Stevens’ opinion, which announced the judgment of the Court, was joined
in its entirety by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer; Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy joined in the portions of Justice Stevens’ decision that concluded that the
habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to relief under section 2254(d)(1). Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy parted from Justice Stevens, however, with regard to the
definition of the standard created by section 2254(d)(1). On this . . . Justice
O’Connor wrote separately in an opinion that was joined in pertinent part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia. Thus, Justice
O’Connor’s analysis of the statutory standard emerged as the 5-Justice majority
decision on the abstract interpretation of section 2254(d)(1), while Justice
Stevens’ opinion constituted the judgment of the Court . . . . The remainder of
Justice Stevens’ opinion (on the interpretation of section 2254(d)(1)) is a 4-Justice
opinion concurring in the judgment, and the remainder of Justice O’Connor’s
opinion (on the application of the section 2254(d)(1) to the facts) is a 2-Justice
concurring opinion (joined by Kennedy, J.). In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist
filed an opinion concurring in part (on the interpretive question) and dissenting in
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2254(d)(1) and what federal courts can and must do when faced with a state
court’s adjudication on the merits. Five Justices agreed with this long-awaited
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1),137 confirming that § 2254(d)(1) did indeed
constitute a new restriction on federal courts’ habeas power. 138 The Supreme
Court explained that in light of Congress’s intent to transform habeas corpus,
concluding that AEDPA did not significantly change the habeas scheme would
be erroneous. 139 Rather, according to the Supreme Court, courts must attribute
independent meaning to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”
prongs of § 2254(d)(1) 140 and recognize the considerable changes Congress had
wrought on federal habeas review.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable
application” prongs constituted independent bases for considering review, but
the Supreme Court disagreed with the specific manner in which the Fourth
Circuit applied each prong. 141 The Court, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute in part, outlined two instances where the “contrary
to” provision would be satisfied as a potential basis for habeas relief. 142 First,
a state court decision would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly
established precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in our cases.” 143 Second, a state court decision would
be “contrary to [the] Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

part (on the application of section 2254(d)(1) to the facts), joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas.
2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1437 n.20.
137. Justice Stevens, who authored the rest of the majority opinion regarding the application
of § 2254(d)(1) to the facts of Williams’s case, wrote separately here; his interpretation of §
2254(d)(1), unlike the majority’s, “essentially contend[ed] that [the provision] does not alter the
previously settled rule of independent review” and that the “unreasonable application” prong
is simply an extension of the “contrary to” prong. Williams, 529 U.S. at 403-04. Justice
O’Connor characterized this viewpoint as giving this section of AEDPA “no effect whatsoever.”
Id. at 403.
138. Id. at 399; see also 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1457-58 (“Put more
simply, the Court understands section 2254(d)(1) as a constraint, not on its power and duty to
determine whether the prisoner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States,’ but, instead, on its power, once having resolved that question, to remedy
any violation found by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.”) (footnote omitted).
139. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 405-06, 408-09. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Williams relied on its holding
in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998).
142. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
143. Id. at 405.
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this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.”144
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the Supreme Court refused to regard as
“contrary to” federal precedent a state court decision that used the correct legal
rule but simply reached a different conclusion. 145 The Supreme Court reasoned
that using the prong in this way would not do justice to the § 2254(d)(1)
requirement that the state court decision be “contrary to” clearly established
precedent because the phrase connotes a decision that is “‘diametrically
different’ from, ‘opposite in character or nature’ from, or ‘mutually opposed’”
to clearly established precedent. 146 Rejecting an expansive interpretation of the
statute, the majority noted, “If a federal habeas court can, under the ‘contrary
to’ clause, issue the writ whenever it concludes that the state court’s application
of clearly established federal law was incorrect, the ‘unreasonable application’
clause becomes a nullity.” 147 This would violate “a cardinal principle of
statutory construction” because the court must, if possible, “give meaning to
every clause of the statute.” 148
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the “unreasonable application” clause of §
2254(d)(1) generally agreed with that of the Fourth Circuit. Again, the Court
identified precisely when a state court’s adjudication of the merits is an
“unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 149 The Court began by explaining
that the subjective “reasonable jurist” standard imposed by the Fourth Circuit
and others150 was an extraneous addition to the statute;151 defining an
“unreasonable application” by that standard would not help the courts and could
lead them to erroneous conclusions.152 The Court explained that determining
whether there has been an “unreasonable application” requires an objective —
not a subjective — inquiry.153 Ultimately, the Court stated that because the
federal courts have an obligation even in habeas cases to define the law, 154 and
Congress explicitly wanted “unreasonable,” not merely misguided, state court
144. Id. at 406.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 407.
148. Id. at 404, 407.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
150. See supra notes 100, 133 and accompanying text.
151. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 409-10 (“The federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a
subjective one by resting its determination instead on the simple fact that at least one of the
Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did in
the habeas petitioner’s case.”).
154. Id. at 411.
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applications of federal law to trigger relief,155 a court “may not issue a writ
simply because [the federal] court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” 156 Under the “unreasonable application” test, the
Court explained, “a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s
case.” 157
In Williams, the federal courts received clear guidance on how to apply each
of the prongs in § 2254(d)(1); finally, the contours of the provision were
defined so that the federal courts had the necessary aid from the U.S. Supreme
Court to determine which state court decisions met the criteria for receiving
habeas corpus relief. The notion that even if a federal court would apply the
law differently, it must defer to a state court’s reasonable application of federal
law marks a strong divergence from the de novo standard of Brown. 158 Despite
the opinion’s noticeable absence of the word “deference,” it is clear that absent
a finding of unreasonable constitutional error, a federal court must uphold the
state court’s decision. In addition to explaining the two main clauses of the
statute, the Supreme Court embedded in the opinion an answer to a question the
federal courts had been asking since AEDPA’s enactment: what rulings
constitute “clearly established Federal law” for § 2254(d)(1) purposes? 159
“[C]learly established Federal law,” 160 the Court declared, denotes “the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.” 161
In applying § 2254(d)(1) to the state court’s treatment of Williams’s petition,
a six-Justice majority concluded that Williams was denied his constitutional

155. Id. at 409-11 (“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry
should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was
objectively unreasonable. . . . [T]he most important point is that an unreasonable application
of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).
156. Id. at 411 (“Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”).
157. Id. at 413.
158. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1507.
159. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1431 n.10.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
161. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Court explained that “clearly established Federal law”
equates to “an old rule” under Teague even though § 2254(d)(1)’s formulation includes only law
issued from the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 15.51, at
905 (“[The § 2254(d)(1) standard] effectively codifies Teague v. Lane: [n]o new rules can be
asserted on habeas corpus; relief can be granted only on the basis of Supreme Court decisions
clearly establishing rights.”).
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right to effective assistance of counsel, as defined in Strickland,162 and that
Williams should be granted habeas relief. 163 The Court clarified that “[t]he
threshold question under AEDPA is whether Williams seeks to apply a rule of
law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became
final.” 164 The Court answered this question in the affirmative and noted that
Strickland governed the merits of Williams’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because the decision’s holding fit the definition of “clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 165
The Court determined that the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of
Williams’s claim warranted relief under both of the prongs of § 2254(d)(1).166
The majority first examined the “contrary to” criterion and determined that by
erroneously supplanting the Strickland framework with Lockhart’s
ineffectiveness standard, the Virginia Supreme Court had acted “contrary to”
clearly established federal law because it had applied a rule that contradicted the
governing law of U.S. Supreme Court cases. 167 The Court noted that Lockhart
was not intended to supplant Strickland in a case such as W illiams’s, where the
ineffective assistance of counsel deprives the defendant of a substantive or
procedural right.168 Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the Virginia
Supreme Court’s decision was an “unreasonable application” in two respects:
first, its improper reliance on the fundamental fairness exception found in
Lockhart, and second, its failure to consider comprehensively the body of
mitigating evidence advanced at trial and developed in the postconviction
proceedings — the totality of which, if introduced, could have altered the jury’s
penalty decision.169
With its instructive interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court
demonstrated that a state court decision applying precedent in the wrong
context and failing to give proper consideration to mitigating evidence in
evaluating prejudicial effect constitutes an adjudication of the claim that is both
“contrary to” and an “unreasonable application” of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent under § 2254(d)(1).170 Williams stands today as a model for federal
162. Williams, 529 U.S. at 399.
163. Id. at 367.
164. Id. at 390.
165. Id. at 391.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 391-98. The other category of “contrary to” cases — where “the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent” — was not a factor in
Williams. Id. at 406.
168. Id. at 393.
169. Id. at 397-98.
170. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.3, at 1449-50; Ides, supra note 87, at 718
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courts to use in interpreting AEDPA, as they can now apply the Supreme
Court’s outlined analysis to habeas review following the state courts’
adjudication of the claims on the merits.
B. Building on the Foundation: Additional Guidance Emerges from the
Supreme Court
Since Williams, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions that provide
guidance on the standard of § 2254(d)(1) and how federal courts should apply
AEDPA. Both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of §
2254(d)(1) have been the subject of controversy; the phrases are sufficiently
cloudy that one may appreciate why interpretations in federal habeas courts
have differed. Questions have arisen concerning requirements of state courts’
use of precedent, prescriptions for federal courts’ methodology in reviewing
decisions pursuant to AEDPA, the extent of the deference implicit in §
2254(d)(1)’s constraints on habeas corpus review, and the flexibility of state
courts in applying legal tests to habeas petitions.
1. The State Court’s Discussion of Precedent
Early v. Packer 171 placed a major limitation on what a court may find
“contrary to” clearly established federal law. In Packer, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief after the Ninth Circuit found
that the state court’s decision denying relief was contrary to established federal
law on several grounds.172 The Court reiterated that a state court decision
would be “contrary to” federal precedent under § 2254(d)(1) if it fulfilled one
of the Williams criteria: either by applying a rule that contradicts precedent or
by reaching a different result than did the Supreme Court when faced with
“materially indistinguishable” facts.173 The Court then added the following
significant qualification to the existing framework: a state court decision would
not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), even if
the state court issued it without knowledge of the applicable Supreme Court
precedent, as long as the state court’s decision was consistent with federal
law.174 The Supreme Court provided the state courts with a seemingly low
threshold to meet when issuing their decisions: avoiding a “contrary to”
(“[A] state court’s failure to apply a critical component of a federal standard is objectively
unreasonable, presumably because a prudent, careful, and competent judge, having recognized
the correct standard, would apply each component of that standard.”).
171. 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (per curiam).
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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designation and its corresponding grant of relief “does not require citation of
our cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as
neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts
them.”175 The Court’s explicit pronouncement that state courts need not discuss
or even be aware of applicable precedent, as long they do not contradict it,
demonstrates the federal courts’ significant deference toward state courts’
decisions under AEDPA.176
2. Methodology of Federal Habeas Review
In addition to directing state courts’ treatment of habeas cases, the Supreme
Court issued guidance to the federal courts concerning their methodology in
analyzing habeas corpus petitions. In Lockyer v. Andrade,177 the Court advised
the federal courts that they had substantial freedom in reviewing state court
decisions but must take seriously the explicit language of AEDPA. 178 In
Andrade, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a state court
decision affirming Andrade’s prolonged sentence 179 was “contrary to” or an
“unreasonable application” of federal precedent under § 2254(d)(1).180 The
Ninth Circuit had applied its own precedent and held that
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law occurs
“when our independent review of the legal question ‘leaves us with
a “firm conviction” that one answer, the one rejected by the [state]
court, was correct and the other, the application of the federal law

175. Id.; see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003), Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d
825, 830-31 (10th Cir. 2003).
176. See Ides, supra note 87, at 727 (“The primary lesson to be gleaned from Early v. Packer
is that a state court’s failure to follow Supreme Court precedent is not to be presumed. Neither
the failure to cite the applicable precedent nor the failure to write an opinion that conforms to
a precise federal formula is sufficient to establish that a state court decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law.”).
177. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
178. Id. at 71.
179. In California, any felony can be the “third strike” that subjects a defendant to a prison
term of twenty-five years to life, if the defendant has also been convicted of two or more serious
or violent felonies. Id. at 67. Andrade was convicted of two counts of petty theft with a prior
conviction, which the prosecutor had the discretion to and chose to prosecute as a felony, as
well as three counts of first-degree residential burglary. Id. at 67-68. The burglary convictions
qualified as “serious or violent” felonies under the three strikes law, and therefore each theft
conviction triggered the increased sentencing separately. Id. at 68. Andrade was sentenced to
two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison. Id.
180. Id. at 73, 77.
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that the [state] court adopted, was erroneous — in other words that
clear error occurred.’”181
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s defining “objectively
unreasonable” to mean “clear error”; “clear error fails to give proper deference
to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” 182
This further elucidation of the meaning of “objectively unreasonable” — or,
rather, what “objectively unreasonable” does not mean — reflects the Court’s
mandate in Williams that (1) reasonableness is measured objectively, not
subjectively,183 and (2) an unreasonable application does not mean merely
incorrect or erroneous.184
In addition to providing guidance regarding the statutory language of
AEDPA, the Supreme Court in Andrade clarified its procedural disagreement
with the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that federal habeas courts review state
court decisions de novo before applying AEDPA’s standard of review.185
Relying on its earlier decision in Weeks v. Angelone,186 the Court emphasized
that determining satisfaction of the “contrary to” or “unreasonable application”
prongs is “the only question that matters” for purposes of the statute. 187 The
Andrade Court stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to
adopt any one methodology.” 188 With this proclamation, the Court in effect
prohibited courts of appeals from foisting a pre-review process on federal
habeas courts under § 2254(d)(1). This procedural tightening on the circuit
courts, however, amounts to a lessening of steps for the district courts; such a
reduction of requirements is analogous to Packer’s declaration that state courts
are not required to discuss federal precedent in their habeas opinions. 189 With
each of these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court conveyed that federal habeas
review, while procedurally complex, does not follow an immutable formula.

181. Id. at 69 (quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000)
(alterations in original)).
182. Id. at 75.
183. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
184. Id. at 411.
185. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71 (citing Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, 1044 n.3 (9th Cir.
2003); Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154-55).
186. 528 U.S. 225 (2000). Weeks concluded that a state need not have a particular structure
for juries to consider mitigating evidence. Id. at 233.
187. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71.
188. Id.; cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978) (holding that absent compelling circumstances, agencies retain discretion over
the formulation of their own procedures and reviewing courts may not impose additional
requirements beyond those required by statute).
189. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).
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Therefore, room exists for courts within the Tenth and other Circuits to exercise
judicial discretion at each level of the habeas review process.
3. Deference of § 2254: What Is It Good for?
An ongoing question in habeas review is the level of deference that state
court decisions should receive from the federal courts that review their
adjudications. Two Supreme Court decisions have shaped the contours of what
is required for federal courts to review state court decisions with an appropriate
degree of deference.190 In Woodford v. Visciotti,191 the Supreme Court again
reversed a Ninth Circuit decision. The circuit court had found a California
Supreme Court decision to be both “contrary to” and an “unreasonable
application” of Strickland, and thus, affirmed the district court’s grant of relief
on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 192 The Supreme Court’s
analysis followed the framework established in Williams, but its discussion of
the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1) is noteworthy for including language
indicating that “a federal court must show respect for state court decisions being
challenged on habeas.” 193
The Supreme Court in Visciotti, unlike Williams, explicitly stated that §
2254(d)(1) is a “highly deferential standard,” 194 and the Court took exception
to the Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to try to reconcile the state court’s
discussion with the “reasonable probability” standard established in
Strickland.195 Strickland, the applicable federal precedent for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, prescribes a “reasonable probability” standard for
gauging if counsel’s conduct has undermined the confidence in the outcome of
the proceedings. 196 The state court referred multiple times to “probable,” with
no modifier of “reasonably”; the Ninth Circuit, instead of acknowledging this
as use of occasional shorthand, held that the state court had applied an
erroneous higher standard of proof.197 The Supreme Court found that because
the state court’s decision described the Strickland standard in detail, the Ninth
190. See Ides, supra note 87, Parts IV.A.1 & C.2, at 719-23, 752-58, for further discussion
of the concept of deference and how it is explored in these and other cases. “[A] sensible
reading is, almost by definition, a properly deferential reading.” Id. at 758.
191. 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 21-22.
193. Ides, supra note 87, at 758.
194. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24 (“It is also [highly] incompatible with § 2254(d)[(1)]’s ‘highly
deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings,’ . . . which demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7
(1997))).
195. Id. at 24-25.
196. Id. at 23.
197. Id.
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Circuit’s selective reading and apparent “readiness to attribute error” was
“inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the
law.” 198
The Supreme Court’s reprimand of the Ninth Circuit in Visciotti for
insufficient deference inevitably leads to an inquiry about what precisely
deference entails. In another decision, Wiggins v. Smith,199 the Court eliminated
any notion that the federal habeas courts should go to extreme lengths to uphold
state courts’ decisions. A state court denied Wiggins’s petition for
postconviction relief, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the state
court’s decision.200 Thereafter, a federal district court granted his habeas
petition, but the Fourth Circuit reversed.201
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court found that the performance of
Wiggins’s trial counsel fell short of the standard set forth in Strickland because
his attorneys’ conduct failed to meet prevailing standards of professionalism
and had a prejudicial effect on the defense. 202 One of the major bases for the
Supreme Court’s conclusion was its belief that the Maryland Court of Appeals,
in examining his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, assumed Wiggins’s
trial attorneys had not conducted any investigation into his personal history
beyond examining social service records and a presentence report made
available by enforcement officials. 203 This conclusion would impute to the state
court’s denial of habeas relief weaker grounds than if that court assumed that
Wiggins’s trial counsel had investigated beyond those records. Citing several
bases, the Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of the Maryland Court of
Appeals’ denial of relief that presumed Wiggins’s attorney had conducted more
thorough research and thereby illustrated only a circumscribed level of
deference to the state court decision. 204 The Supreme Court not only declined
to defer to the state court’s decision, it opted to view the state-level decision as
having less evidentiary support than an alternative, plausible reading embraced
by the dissent.205
Wiggins teaches that “a federal court need not engage in a strained reading
of a state court opinion in order to avoid a potential constitutional flaw in that
decision.” 206 Considered in combination with the Supreme Court’s mild rebuke
198. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
199. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
200. Id. at 518-19.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 533-34, 538.
203. Id. at 523-24. The dissent heartily disagreed with this finding and presented
commentary to support the opposite holding. Id. at 538-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 523-29 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 545-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Ides, supra note 87, at 758.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/4

COMMENT

2005]

497

in Visciotti toward federal courts that do not afford state courts their due
respect, the Supreme Court appears to instruct federal courts neither to presume
state court decisions are automatically flawless, nor ascribe to those decisions
such deference that a labored or unsupported interpretation of the opinion is
required to support their holdings.
4. Legal Tests in the AEDPA Framework
In 2004, the Supreme Court addressed another aspect of AEDPA that the
statutory language itself leaves untouched: the circumstances under which a
federal court can determine if a state court’s application of a legal test is
“unreasonable.” In Yarborough v. Alvarado,207 the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and denied habeas relief to a seventeen-year-old interviewed without
parents or counsel.208 The federal district court had denied habeas relief,
agreeing with the state court that the youth had not been “in custody” for
Miranda 209 purposes and stating that “[a]t a minimum . . . the deferential
standard of review provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) foreclosed relief.” 210 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion and granted habeas relief.211
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and denied
habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), applying the principles outlined in Williams
and examining the state court’s test for deciding whether a defendant is in
custody for Miranda purposes.212
In Alvarado, the Court thoroughly addressed state courts’ treatment of legal
tests in determining whether the state court’s decision implicated the
“unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1). 213 According to the Court,
even though federal judges are familiar with the meaning of the term
“unreasonable,”
the range of . . . judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant
rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of
the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general,
and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time.
Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial
element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application
was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

541 U.S. 652 (2004) (5-4 decision).
Id. at 668-69.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 659, 669.
Id. at 663-64.
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general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in
case by case determinations.214
The Alvarado opinion reiterated that the federal courts could not grant relief
under AEDPA by conducting a de novo review of the state court’s decision.215
The Court further explained that in this case, the state court’s determination was
reasonable because the Miranda custody test is a general test and the state
court’s application of federal law “fits within the matrix” of Supreme Court
decisions.216 According to the Court, the state court’s ruling that jurors could
find that the teenager was not in custody for Miranda purposes was a
reasonable application of clearly established law.217 By allowing considerable
leeway for state courts to apply legal tests, the holding in Alvarado stressed yet
again the “deferential standard” that § 2254(d)(1) prescribes for state court
decisions. The undefined boundaries of a “general” test and the “matrix” of
clearly established federal precedent, however, seem likely to produce more
controversy in federal habeas review than the guidelines of AEDPA and the
cases discussed in this section will prevent.
IV. The Tenth Circuit Strives, Seeks, Finds — and Yields
Following the Supreme Court’s analysis of AEDPA in Williams, “federal
court[s] [clearly are] no longer free to grant habeas relief based solely on [their]
independent interpretation and application of federal law.” 218 The standard of
review set forth in AEDPA has played and will continue to play a major role in
Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s trend of constricting federal habeas relief.
An examination of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decisions since
the passage of AEDPA provides a useful study of the effect of § 2254(d)(1) on
petitions for writs of habeas relief. In the midst of the federal courts’ language
of “deference” and “comity,” a question arises concerning just how far those
principles extend. Since the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, the Tenth Circuit
has rarely ordered a state prisoner released from custody, reduced a state
prisoner’s sentence, or remanded his case for further proceedings. 219 The Tenth
Circuit has, however, granted some relief under § 2254(d)(1)220 based on
214. Id.
215. Id. at 665.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 664. Justice Breyer issued a strongly worded dissent, concluding that a
reasonable person would not have felt that he could leave the police interrogation, and the Ninth
Circuit was correct in finding that the state courts unreasonably applied federal precedent. Id.
at 669-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1495 (citations omitted).
219. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
220. In some instances, of course, relief may be premised on grounds in addition to 28
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findings that state court decisions were “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 221 A careful examination of the Tenth
Circuit’s rationale in these cases demonstrates that, for the most part, courts
have found grounds for habeas relief in the limited instances Congress indicated
in AEDPA and the Supreme Court clarified in Williams.222 Where the Tenth
Circuit did grant relief under § 2254(d)(1), the state court’s decision diverged
substantially from applicable federal precedent, or the state court applied the
correct precedent, but in a manner the Tenth Circuit found objectively
unreasonable.223
A. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The issue that federal habeas corpus petitions across the nation raise most
frequently is that the state prisoner has received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 224 For example, the petitioner may allege that his trial counsel failed
to offer mitigating evidence or neglected to cross-examine a key prosecution
witness. 225 Petitioners for habeas relief rarely cite claims such as Fourth
Amendment violations, prosecutorial misconduct, or other constitutional
violations by the trial court, prosecutor, or police as grounds for the issuance of
a writ.226 The notion that a defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel that
does not violate Strickland — that is, legal assistance neither deficient nor
prejudicial227 — is one that resonates with both courts and nonlegal observers,
especially in proceedings where the trial counsel’s ineptitude could result in an
extended prison sentence or even capital punishment. The Tenth Circuit has
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
222. See discussion infra Part V.A.
223. See discussion infra Part V.A.
224. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS v (1995).
225. Id.; see also Flango & McKenna, supra note 71, at 245-58. “[M]ost ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are not based on the counsel’s failure to raise a federal claim or
defense, but rather involve the attorney’s decision that affected the development of facts at
trial.” Id. at 248 (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990)).
226. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at v; Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation, supra
note 18, at 3. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims account for 25% of the issues petitioners
raised in habeas corpus petitions. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at 14. Trial court errors
constitute 15%; Fourteenth Amendment constitute 14%; Fifth Amendment constitute 12%;
Sixth Amendment constitute 7%; Eighth Amendment constitute 7%; prosecutorial misconduct
constitute 6%; Fourth Amendment constitute 5%. Id. Other claims account for 9%. Id.
227. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the use of the Strickland standard in Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510 (2003)).
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made explicit reference to the weight courts should give such claims: “The
gravity of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be overstated. ‘Of
all the rights that an accused person has, the ability to be represented by counsel
is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he
may have.’” 228 The Supreme Court, however, has ordered courts to give
attorneys’ actions a presumption of soundness, and the Tenth Circuit “review[s]
counsel’s performance with great deference,” even above the deference
prescribed by AEDPA.229
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Grants of Release or Revocation of Capital Sentence
Under § 2254(d)(1)
Several cases illustrate the extreme disagreement the Tenth Circuit must have
with the state court’s application of federal precedent before granting a
petitioner either release or revocation of his capital sentence under §
2254(d)(1). The Tenth Circuit found sufficient grounds to overturn the state
court’s application of Strickland in Battenfield v. Gibson. 230 In Battenfield, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) denied postconviction relief on
several grounds, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during
the penalty phase of the trial. 231 Because the OCCA did not mention the
defense attorney’s failure to investigate mitigating evidence in its denial, the
Tenth Circuit was free to analyze the state court’s treatment of that claim as not
having been adjudicated on the merits and therefore subject to independent
review.232 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit examined the OCCA’s denial as if
the state court had implicitly included the investigative efforts and would have
found the OCCA’s application of Strickland unreasonable using either an
independent or deferential approach. 233 This case, therefore, still provides an
example of analysis of § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” prong.

228. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 929 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986)).
229. Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)); see also discussion infra at Part V.B.2; cf. Torres v.
Lytle, No. 03-2098, 2004 WL 103557, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004) (unpub. op.) (concluding
that the deferential standard applied to sufficiency of the evidence claims combined with
AEDPA deference “amounts to deference squared”).
230. 236 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
231. Id. at 1220.
232. Id. at 1229 n.7; see LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999) (“If the
claim was not heard on the merits by the state courts, and the federal district court made its own
determination in the first instance, we review the district court's conclusions of law de novo and
its findings of fact, if any, for clear error.”).
233. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 n.7.
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Battenfield’s defense attorney failed to interview anyone, including the
defendant himself, regarding possible mitigating aspects of the defendant’s
background. 234 This failure to investigate violated the attorney’s duty to
conduct a reasonable inquiry and also rendered him unable to competently
advise the defendant regarding the penalty phase of the trial. 235 The Tenth
Circuit’s opinion expressed disbelief at the OCCA’s conclusion that the defense
counsel failed to present mitigating evidence because of the petitioner’s
knowing, intelligent waiver of his right to present that evidence.236 The Tenth
Circuit found this reasoning to be fatally flawed because the petitioner’s trial
counsel had not “conduct[ed] a constitutionally adequate pretrial
investigation.” 237 The Tenth Circuit explained that defense counsel’s conduct
could not have been a strategic decision because the attorney was ignorant of
any other mitigation approach he could have presented to the court. 238
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found that this ineffective assistance of
counsel prejudiced the petitioner under the Strickland standard.239 Because
significant mitigating evidence was available to balance against a single
aggravating factor, a reasonable probability existed that the jury would have
found that the defendant was not a continuing threat to society.240 The Tenth
Circuit found that the deficient conduct “‘so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the [penalty phase of] the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.’” 241 The Tenth Circuit characterized the
state court’s contrary conclusion and application of Strickland as “patently
unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1) and instructed the district court to grant the
writ for the petitioner’s death sentence. 242 The state court was to follow the
district court’s action by either conducting a new sentencing trial or imposing
a noncapital sentence.243 Battenfield demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit’s
deference, like the Supreme Court’s, extends only so far. If the conduct of trial
counsel is so deficient or prejudicial that it substantially harms the guilt or
sentencing phases, the federal court will temper its deferential viewpoint and
grant habeas relief when necessary to ensure fairness to the state prisoner.

234. Id. at 1228.
235. Id. at 1229.
236. Id. at 1233.
237. Id. at 1234.
238. Id. at 1229.
239. Id. at 1235.
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (alteration in
original)).
242. Id. at 1233, 1235.
243. Id. at 1235.
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In Hooper v. Mullin,244 the Tenth Circuit again found grounds for habeas
relief under § 2254(d)(1) and upheld the W estern District of Oklahoma’s nondeferential grant of habeas relief, which the OCCA had denied. 245 After a jury
convicted Hooper of capital murder, Hooper alleged that his defense attorneys’
performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland. 246 In preparation
for trial, Hooper’s attorneys retained a psychologist, who gave Hooper
neuropsychological tests following six months of therapy; these tests indicated
lingering mental problems but also great improvement in Hooper’s ability to
handle stress and “largely adequate” cognitive functioning. 247 Hooper’s
attorneys then had another psychologist prepare a one-page summary based
solely on the other doctor’s report.248 This report described Hooper’s mental
status in less positive terms, noting the possibility of a serious psychiatric
disorder or brain damage and emphasizing the need for further diagnostic
investigation.249 The attorneys did not contact the second doctor again until
after the jury found Hooper guilty of murder; they then requested that doctor’s
testimony at the sentencing proceeding.250 The second doctor told the attorneys
that he could not ethically testify, because he had never met the petitioner and
his testimony would likely be an aggravating rather than mitigating factor in the
sentencing.251 Nevertheless, both of the reports were admitted into evidence,
and the second doctor was subpoenaed to testify. Hooper’s attorneys did not
prepare the second doctor for trial, and the physician told the jurors that he did
not put “enormous stock” in his own conclusions in the one-page summary.252
When the prosecution called the first doctor in rebuttal, his testimony further
damaged Hooper because the doctor said he had found no special problems, no
brain damage, and only a mild learning disability.253
Both the OCCA and the district court found that the actions of Hooper’s
attorneys were prejudicial under Strickland,254 but the OCCA did not find that
the attorneys’ performance met the “deficient performance” prong of
Strickland. 255 The OCCA reached this determination even though it
acknowledged the doctors’ testimony “was disastrous” for Hooper, counsel’s
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

314 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1167-68.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id.
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failure to speak with the first doctor before trial was “inexplicable” and
“overwhelmingly prejudicial,” and Hooper himself had raised significant
doubts about calling the second doctor to testify and admitting both reports.256
The OCCA concluded that Hooper had not shown his attorneys’ actions
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and denied Hooper’s request for an
evidentiary hearing to explore trial counsel’s rationalizations for the prejudicial
actions.257 On habeas review, however, the district court granted an evidentiary
hearing and found that the trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient under Strickland.258
The Tenth Circuit agreed, even though it reviewed the attorneys’
performance “with great deference.” 259 Both the attorneys’ conduct and the
state court’s application of Strickland were objectively unreasonable, concluded
the Tenth Circuit, and the § 2254(d)(1) standard mandated relief.260 The Tenth
Circuit’s opinion criticized the attorneys’ decision not to further investigate
Hooper’s mental status, especially given that the second doctor’s report
specifically recommended further diagnosis.261 In addition, the Tenth Circuit
criticized the attorneys’ decision not to interview the doctors before they
testified and further stated that “[a] ‘decision not to undertake substantial
pretrial investigation and instead to “investigate” the case during the trial [i]s
not only uninformed, it [i]s patently unreasonable.’” 262 Because the defense
attorneys chose a strategy that required them to present psychological evidence,
they should have conducted further exploration.263 Finally, the Tenth Circuit
denounced the attorneys’ lack of foresight in offering the first physician as a
witness, thereby leaving him eligible for the prosecution to use in rebuttal.264
Because the defense attorneys made an objectively unreasonable decision to
rely on the testimony and reports without adequate investigation, and did so in
“an unprepared, uninformed, and disastrous manner,” 265 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision granting Hooper relief from his death
sentences.266

256. Id. at 1169.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1167.
259. Id. at 1169.
260. Id. at 1169-71.
261. Id. at 1170-71.
262. Id. at 1171 (quoting Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 2002) (alterations
in original)).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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As in Battenfield and Hooper, the Tenth Circuit found the state court’s
application of federal precedent unreasonable in Holmes v. McKune.267 The
Tenth Circuit reviewed the state prisoner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim under § 2254(d)(1) with reference to pre-Strickland Supreme Court law,
which applied either a “mockery of justice” standard or a “reasonably
competent assistance” standard.268 The Tenth Circuit noted that even before
Strickland, every person had the right to effective assistance of counsel, and an
attorney’s failure to investigate the facts violated this “clearly established”
Supreme Court law.269 Holmes retained an attorney, previously appointed when
Holmes shot and killed a man named Miller, to assist him with charges of rape,
assault, and kidnapping while the manslaughter charge was still pending.270
Although Holmes provided his attorney with a list of alibi witnesses, the
attorney did not speak with any of them or call them to the stand.271 The state
court’s postconviction hearing showed that these witnesses, including Holmes’s
mother, “could have added ‘a great deal of substance and credibility’ to the
defendant’s alibi” during the time the rape occurred. 272 The state called Miller’s
cousin to testify, and he claimed that Holmes confessed to the crime twice;
Holmes’s attorney, however, never mentioned to the jury the long-standing feud
between the witness and the defendant or the fact that Holmes had killed the
witness’s cousin. 273 At the state court postconviction hearing, Holmes’s
attorney claimed that he had relied on the defendant to bring alibi witnesses to
his office, that he had “no way of knowing” if the state would interview
witnesses beyond the three called to testify, and that he could not remember
why Holmes’s mother was not asked to testify. 274 The state court judge,
declaring that “‘an attorney has a right to rely upon his client to . . . [get]
witnesses in to talk to you before trial,’” 275 found that “Holmes had some
267. No. 01-3004, 2003 WL 220496, at *4 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (unpub. op.). Holmes
had been released on parole at the time of the habeas proceedings, but the restrictions on his
liberty as part of his probation — including restricting his activities to his residence, mandatory
meetings and approval of his employment, and risk of being incarcerated again — sufficiently
placed him “in custody” for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at *1 n.2.
268. Id. at *9-10. The Tenth Circuit did not use Strickland in reviewing the state court
decision because that case was decided four days after the Kansas Court of Appeals decided
petitioner’s appeal of his first postconviction proceeding in 1984, and therefore “Strickland was
not ‘clearly established federal law’” at that time. Id. at *8.
269. Id. at *9.
270. Id. at *3.
271. Id. at *3, *5.
272. Id. at *11 (quoting Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 2000)).
273. Id. at *4. Apparently the attorney feared “it might prejudice the jury to know that
Holmes was charged with manslaughter.” Id.
274. Id. at *6.
275. Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
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obligation to assist in this matter” 276 in light of the fact that the Holmeses were
the only black family in a “white” community.277 The judge gave this
admonishment despite the fact that Holmes was eighteen years old and this was
his first trial.278
The state court found that the attorney could have determined that the alibi
witnesses would not have assisted the defendant and perhaps would have
harmed his defense, and the state court ultimately denied relief. 279 The state
court of appeals affirmed on appeal, and Holmes brought a petition for habeas
corpus in district court. When the district court likewise denied relief, Holmes
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.280
The Tenth Circuit held that using either of the pre-Strickland standards, the
attorney’s conduct was ineffective and prejudicial, and the state court’s ruling
was therefore an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law under §
2254(d)(1). 281 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the state court’s placing the
onus of finding defense witnesses on the defendant because preparing the
defense is “clearly” the obligation of the attorney and “[d]efense counsel must
always investigate an alibi defense.” 282 When Holmes’s own attorney
abandoned his only defense, he both “made a ‘mockery of justice’” and failed
to render “‘reasonably competent assistance,’” thus providing ineffective
assistance under any reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 283 In
examining whether the attorney’s conduct was prejudicial,284 the Tenth Circuit
focused on the attorney’s failure to call key witnesses to the stand. 285 The court
noted that the state’s case against Holmes was weak 286 because each of its
witnesses’ testimonies had flaws and discrepancies;287 thus, the defense
attorney’s conduct was especially harmful. 288 This deficient performance,
combined with the state’s witnesses’ lack of credibility289 and the defense

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *3.
279. Id. at *7.
280. Id.
281. Id. at *9, *14.
282. Id. at *10 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932)).
283. Id. at *9-10.
284. Although the court applied pre-Strickland standards, “the prejudice requirement of
Strickland added nothing new to the law as it stood at the time of Holmes’s first state collateral
appeal.” Id. at *11.
285. Id. at *11-14.
286. Id. at *13.
287. See id. at *3-5.
288. Id. at *13, *14.
289. Id. at *14.
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attorney’s failure to highlight the state’s poor physical evidence against
Holmes, 290 was prejudicial to Holmes’s defense. 291 Because the state court’s
finding that Holmes received effective assistance of counsel “could not have
been justified by a finding of no prejudice,” 292 the Tenth Circuit held that the
state court’s denial of habeas corpus relief was an “unreasonable application”
of federal precedent.293 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment
and remanded the case with instructions that the lower court issue a writ of
habeas corpus.294
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Grants of Other Types of Habeas Relief Under §
2254(d)(1)
The Tenth Circuit does not always grant habeas relief such as that seen in
Battenfield, Hooper, and Holmes, though a “conditional release” order is the
most common habeas remedy today.295 In two early applications of §
2254(d)(1), for example, the Tenth Circuit vacated the cases and granted the
petitioner an evidentiary hearing into the matter of ineffective assistance, rather
than revoking the capital sentence or releasing the petitioner from custody.296
In both Miller v. Champion 297 and Mayes v. Gibson,298 the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the state and district courts and found that the petitioner alleged
facts sufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland.299
In Miller, although the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder, he
claimed that his defense attorney failed to inform him of the “depraved mind”
element of the crime and that he would have proceeded to trial had he been so
informed.300 The Tenth Circuit found that depraved mind was a critical element
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 33.3, at 1503. A range of changes in custodial
status is available via habeas relief, short of conditional or unconditional termination of physical
custody. Id. § 33.1, at 1499. These alternative forms of habeas relief include “changes in the
type, terms, length, and conditions of custody; ending or modifying certain restraints on liberty
short of physical custody, such as probation, parole, and ‘on recognizance’ status; and, in some
circumstances, enjoining the collateral consequences of a conviction . . . .” Id. § 33.1, at 1500
(citations omitted).
296. Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2000) (2-1 decision); Miller v. Champion,
161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
297. 161 F.3d 1249.
298. 210 F.3d 1284.
299. Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1290, 1291; Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254-56, 1259.
300. Miller, 161 F.3d at 1251.
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of second-degree murder and that nothing in the “skeletal” factual record
indicated that Miller’s attorney had explained this element to him at any time
or that Miller knew about it from another source.301 In addition, the Tenth
Circuit found that if a jury had heard Miller’s uncontested account of the story,
it would have likely found Miller innocent, or guilty of no more than firstdegree manslaughter. 302 Concluding that without a full development of the
factual record the district court could not apply Strickland to dismiss the habeas
action, the Tenth Circuit granted Miller limited habeas relief in the form of an
evidentiary hearing.303
In Mayes, the Tenth Circuit was “deeply disturbed by the manner in which
defense counsel apparently handled the sentencing phase” of the trial304 but
could not find an adequate basis in the factual record to show that the attorney’s
conduct violated Mayes’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.305 In light of the constitutionally protected right to present mitigating
evidence to the jury, 306 the Tenth Circuit found that the “only possible
inference” from Mayes’s production of eleven mitigating affidavits from people
who were never asked to testify is that “any investigation conducted by defense
counsel fell well short of the mark of reasonableness.” 307 The attorney’s failure
to contact any mitigating witnesses, combined with the state’s relatively weak
case, the jury’s considerable trouble with its sentencing deliberations, and the
ultimate finding of only one aggravating factor, convinced the Tenth Circuit
that Strickland’s deficient performance and prejudice standards had been met.308
As in Miller, the Tenth Circuit held that the petitioner in Mayes was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to fully explore his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.309 The Tenth Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s order
dismissing his petition for habeas relief.310
The Tenth Circuit again granted conditional habeas corpus relief when it
tackled the unconventional issue of Battered-Woman Syndrome (BWS). 311 In
301. Id. at 1255, 1256.
302. Id. at 1258-59.
303. Id. at 1259. Because Miller was decided after AEDPA was enacted in 1996 but before
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000), the Tenth Circuit applied § 2254(d)(1) but did not provide an explicit explanation as to
how the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. Miller, 161 F.3d at 1259.
304. Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1286.
305. Id. at 1286-87.
306. Id. at 1288 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 393).
307. Id. at 1289.
308. Id. at 1291.
309. Id. at 1287, 1289.
310. Id. at 1287.
311. Battered-woman syndrome is defined legally as “[a] constellation of medical and
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Paine v. Massie,312 the petitioner claimed that her counsel’s failure to offer
expert testimony on BWS constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland.313 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Paine that the deficient
performance criterion of Strickland was met and that the state court’s denial of
relief was an “objectively unreasonable application” of federal precedent under
§ 2254(d)(1). 314 Under the standard of Williams, the state court’s application
of the Strickland rule to the prisoner’s case could be found unreasonable even
though the state court identified Strickland as the correct governing legal rule.315
The Tenth Circuit concluded that because the trial counsel’s performance was
both “deficient” and “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’” 316
the state court’s affirmation of Paine’s conviction constituted an unreasonable
application of Strickland.317 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that § 2254(d)(1)
circumscribed its ability to grant habeas relief 318 and fully explained how the
state court should have applied Strickland.319
The Tenth Circuit’s rationale for finding that the state court unreasonably
applied Strickland includes two clear examples of inexpertise by petitioner’s
counsel. First, although the petitioner’s counsel “put a BWS theory in play”
and the trial court issued a BWS-specific jury instruction, the attorney failed to
produce a BWS expert or explain the theory to the jury. 320 Instead, counsel
used an expert who specialized in determining defendants’ competency to stand
trial and neglected to question the expert about BWS or whether the defendant
suffered from that condition.321 The Tenth Circuit proclaimed that this failure
to offer a BWS expert “effectively eviscerated” the petitioner’s self-defense
theory. 322 Second, because the reviewing state court in a prior opinion 323 had
focused extensively on the “key” component of the reasonableness of a BWS
sufferer’s fear in a self-defense claim, the Tenth Circuit found that the failure
psychological conditions of a woman who has suffered physical, sexual, or emotional abuse at
the hands of a spouse or lover. . . . This syndrome is sometimes proposed as a defense to justify
or mitigate a woman’s killing of a man.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004).
312. 339 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003).
313. Id. at 1196.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1198.
316. Id. at 1200 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
317. Id. at 1204.
318. Id. at 1198.
319. Id. at 1200-05.
320. Id. at 1201-02.
321. Id. at 1201. The Tenth Circuit opinion further notes that because defense attorneys
conceded that this physician was not a BWS expert, such testimony probably would not have
been admissible even if obtained by counsel. Id.
322. Id. at 1204.
323. Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, 840 P.2d 1.
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of Paine’s counsel to question a physician he presented as a witness regarding
the reasonableness of Paine’s fear was objectively unreasonable, even though
the witness was not a BWS expert. 324 The Tenth Circuit noted that the prior
state case created “the professional standard in Oklahoma for an attorney
representing a battered woman claiming self-defense, i.e., the attorney must put
on an expert to explain BWS to the jury.” 325 Further, the opinion cited the
Supreme Court decision in Wiggins v. Smith 326 for the proposition that “an
attorney’s failure to follow ‘standard practice’” amounts to objectively
unreasonable performance.327 Because the prior state case held that in
Oklahoma the “‘key to the defense of self-defense is reasonableness’” within
the BWS framework and a “‘defendant must show that she had a reasonable
belief as to the imminence of great bodily harm or death and as to the force
necessary to compel it,’” 328
counsel’s failure to offer expert BWS testimony to provide context
for the jury on the reasonableness of [petitioner’s] subjective fear
amount[ed] to objectively unreasonable performance. . . . Simply
put, counsel failed to do something the [state court] said was
necessary to mount an effective self-defense claim given the jury’s
likely misconceptions about BWS.329
Because Paine “easily cleared” the hurdle of showing that her counsel
performed unreasonably, 330 the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to allow the
petitioner to produce an expert witness.331 This expert’s testimony could
determine whether counsel’s conduct had a “prejudicial effect” on the trial
proceedings, and thus, whether counsel was ineffective under both prongs of
Strickland.332 If a BWS expert would testify both that the petitioner was
suffering from BWS at the time of the crime and that the petitioner had a
reasonable belief that “deadly force was necessary to protect herself from
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,” 333 the district court was
instructed to grant habeas relief.334
As demonstrated in the above cases, the Tenth Circuit is taking Congress’s
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Paine, 339 F.3d at 1202-03.
Id. at 1202.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
Paine, 339 F.3d at 1202 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523-24).
Id. at 1199 (quoting Bechtel, ¶ 28, 840 P.2d at 10).
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id. at 1205.
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command and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) seriously; the
state courts’ application of Strickland in these cases does appear
“unreasonable,” rather than simply erroneous or incorrect.335
V. Analysis
A. The Tenth Circuit Is Performing as Commanded
Since AEDPA’s enactment, the Tenth Circuit has granted habeas relief in
relatively few ineffective assistance of counsel cases.336 In addition, the Tenth
Circuit has only infrequently found unreasonable applications of or applications
contrary to federal precedent with other habeas claims. These claims include:
sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia,337 harmless error analysis
under Chapman v. California 338 and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 339 prosecution’s
suppression of evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 340 violation of the

335. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).
336. See discussion supra Part IV.
337. See Torres v. Lytle, No. 03-2098, 2004 WL 103557, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004)
(unpub. op.) (finding state court application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979),
“contrary to” federal precedent, when the state court determined that sufficient evidence was
present for a conviction solely on account of a lack of evidence to the contrary).
338. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
339. 507 U.S. 619 (1993); see Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the OCCA’s conclusion that the court’s response to a jury question was harmless
error was an “unreasonable application” of Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, or Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154 (1994)); Herrera v. LeMaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000), (holding that
state court’s failure to apply correct governing rule in finding that admission of evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment was harmless error was “contrary to” clearly established
precedent), rev’d en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002); Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988,
996-97 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the OCCA’s determination of harmless error of
defendant’s videotaped confession under Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, was an “unreasonable
application” of Supreme Court precedent).
340. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999) (2-1
decision) (holding that the OCCA’s determination that undisclosed evidence was immaterial
was an unreasonable application of Brady when the state’s case was entirely circumstantial and
a reasonable probability existed that proof that the state’s evidence was planted against the
defendant would change the outcome of the proceeding). The Tenth Circuit is still unsettled
as to whether a related issue, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, is governed by §
2254(d)(1) as a question of law or by § 2254(d)(2) as a question of fact. See Turrentine v.
Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1197 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151
(10th Cir. 2003); Moore, 195 F.3d at 1176-77); see also Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213,
1227-29 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding “[e]ven in light of the heightened deference accorded the
decisions of state courts under the provisions of the AEDPA,” the OCCA’s determination of
sufficient evidence to allow a death penalty aggravator was unreasonable under either §
2254(d)(2), which is the provision the Tenth Circuit relied upon, or § 2254(d)(1)).
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Confrontation Clause under Ohio v. Roberts,341 and due process violations,342
including the denial of lesser-included offense instructions to the jury under
Beck v. Alabama. 343 The Tenth Circuit has granted habeas relief, in opposition
to the state appellate court’s ruling, in only a small number of cases for each of
these types of claims.
The Tenth Circuit’s holdings in these cases may appeal to both the lawyer
and the layperson — neglecting to inform the client of a critical element of the

341. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 531 U.S. 36 (2004); see
Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 840 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the state court’s application
of Roberts was “unreasonable,” when state court found no Sixth Amendment violation in the
admission of preliminary testimony by an absent witness).
342. See Mollett v. Mullin, 348 F.3d 902, 922 (10th Cir. 2003) (relying on Johnson, 254
F.3d at 1165, in affirming the district court’s grant of habeas relief because of the OCCA’s
“unreasonable” and “contrary to” application of Fourteenth Amendment and Simmons, 512 U.S.
at 171, when the state court found no due process violation in a trial court’s refusal to explain
to the jury the difference under Oklahoma law between life imprisonment and life imprisonment
without parole); Beem v. McKune, 278 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2002) (vacating defendants’
convictions and sentences when state court found no Fourteenth Amendment violation and only
harmless error after defendants were sentenced for crimes “for which they were not charged,
tried, or convicted”); Rojem v. Gibson, 245 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming district
court’s holding that the OCCA’s application of federal precedent to deny relief for Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendment violations was both “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application”
of clearly established federal law when the jury was permitted to impose the death penalty
without a weighing-of-factors instruction and by applying its instructions in a manner that
prevented it from considering mitigating evidence); Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1211,
1216-20 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s order of a new sentencing proceeding
using a pre-Williams interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) because (1) the state court’s analysis of
state’s closing argument’s effect on defendant’s denial of fundamental fairness was both
“contrary to” governing Supreme Court authority and based on an “unreasonable” view of the
state court proceedings, where the argument prejudicially infringed on defendant’s
constitutional rights and the state court ignored the prosecutor’s deliberate misrepresentations;
(2) the state court’s affirmance of defendant’s death sentence despite the denial of the due
process right to explain or deny evidence against him and his right to present mitigating
evidence was “contrary to” clearly established federal law; and (3) the state court’s finding that
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights had not been violated was based on an “unreasonable
determination” of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial (invoking § 2254(d)(2))).
343. 447 U.S. 625 (1980); see Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1193-94 (vacating petitioner’s
conviction and sentence on two of four counts of first degree murder because the OCCA’s
application of a harmless error standard other than Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18, was “contrary to”
clearly established federal law and the improper jury instructions were a violation of Beck);
Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1050 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the state appellate
court’s conclusion that the defendant was precluded by state law from relying on earlier
testimony to request lesser included jury instructions was an “unreasonable application” of
Beck, but ultimately granting conditional habeas relief on alternate due process grounds for
which no adjudication on the merits had occurred).
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crime 344 or expecting the accused defendant to supply his own alibi defense 345
is flagrantly deficient — but actual trial conduct is not what the Tenth Circuit
primarily focuses on under § 2254(d)(1). Rather, the Tenth Circuit principally
examines how the state-level appellate court applied the relevant governing
legal rule to the trial proceedings and underlying facts, and whether that
application is objectively unreasonable or contrary to federal precedent. The
Tenth Circuit’s decisions indicate a continued contraction of the availability of
habeas relief to state prisoners.346 The cases above show that a petitioner
attempting to convince the Tenth Circuit that it should grant habeas relief is
unlikely to be successful unless the Tenth Circuit finds that the state court
overtly misapplied federal law. 347 Moreover, the relief granted may not be the
sort the petitioner desires; for instance, if the Tenth Circuit’s grant applies only
to the penalty phase of the proceedings, the grant will not upset the state
petitioner’s original conviction and he will likely suffer severe consequences
notwithstanding the habeas relief as to the term of his sentence.
B. Important Considerations for the Tenth Circuit Habeas Petitioner
Even if the “unreasonable application” or “contrary to” finding is plausible
for the petitioner’s case, the following factors continue to weigh against a state
prisoner seeking federal habeas relief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit: (1) the reasons Tenth Circuit judges commonly provide for denying
habeas relief; (2) the federal courts’ desire to fulfill the policy goals of §
2254(d)(1);348 and (3) the increasing number of federal habeas petitions filed,
which indicates an increasingly overloaded docket and an incentive for the
federal courts to deny habeas relief.349 Thus, a state petitioner seeking federal
habeas relief will have a difficult time convincing the Tenth Circuit that the
state court decision was “unreasonable” or “contrary to” clearly established
federal law. In addition, special considerations emerge from the analysis of
habeas claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel within the Tenth
Circuit.

344. See Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998).
345. See Holmes v. McKune, No. 01-3004, 2003 WL 220496, at *7 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2003)
(unpub. op.).
346. Barr, supra note 30, at 500 (commenting upon the Tenth Circuit’s holdings in regard
to the harmless-error and retroactivity doctrines).
347. See discussion supra Part IV.
348. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436 (2000).
349. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
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1. Dissension Within the Ranks of the Tenth Circuit
The U.S. Supreme Court decided only one case dealing with § 2254(d)(1)
during the 2004 Term,350 and no major changes to the habeas statute have been
proposed. Thus, habeas counsel in the Tenth Circuit can rely on the standards
and rationales set forth thus far. In addition, a habeas attorney can benefit from
studying not only the majority holdings of Tenth Circuit cases, as discussed
above, but also the strong dissenting opinions, which argue that the state
appellate courts’ denials of relief should be upheld. These dissenting opinions
indicate grants of relief issued with a two-to-one majority, clearly hinting that
the state court decisions could plausibly be read as either acceptable under or
violative of § 2254(d)(1) and that a petitioner cannot be guaranteed a grant of
habeas relief from the Tenth Circuit, no matter how compelling his particular
facts may appear.351 The opinions’ mention of “reasonableness” and
“speculation” also envisions a certain degree of flexibility and uncertainty in the
Tenth Circuit’s application of the AEDPA standard, which further compounds
the habeas petitioner’s improbability of obtaining relief under § 2254(d)(1).
In Mayes v. Gibson, the dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s
grant of an evidentiary hearing because the dissent believed that the eleven
testimonial affidavits proffered by the defendant at the postconviction hearing
were inadequate to determine the prejudicial effect of their absence under
Strickland. 352 The affiants included family members and friends who indicated
that they would have testified, if requested, about the defendant’s kind
behavior, work ethic, and history of being abused. 353 The dissent agreed with
the OCCA and the district court in a “subjective” determination that presenting
affidavits to “individual jurists, each bringing his or her own professional and
life experiences to bear on the issue of what a jury would have concluded,”
probably would not have affected the outcome of Mayes’s sentencing
proceeding.354 Like the majority, the dissent focused on the Sixth Amendment

350. In Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and determined that the California Supreme Court was not “objectively unreasonable” in finding
that the state’s “catch-all” mitigation instruction, which directs the jury to consider “‘[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for
the crime,’” is constitutional as applied to post-crime mitigation evidence.
351. See Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1294 (10th Cir. 2000) (Brorby, J., dissenting);
Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1236-39 (10th Cir. 2001) (Kelly, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1178-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kelly, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
352. Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1294 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 1289 (majority opinion).
354. Id. at 1294 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
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inquiry as one of “reasonableness.” 355 Unlike the majority, the dissent found
reasonable the OCCA’s belief that producing mitigating affidavits would not
have changed the jurors’ decision.356
Essentially, the dissenting opinion argued that a determination of prejudicial
effect cannot be sufficiently objective for the court of appeals to make such a
conclusion regarding a decision that has already fully addressed the claims.
This view makes sense because inherently subjective factors necessarily will
contribute to the “objective” standard of reasonableness. In a § 2254(d)(1)
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Tenth Circuit will make important
reasonableness determinations at several levels. First, the Tenth Circuit
examines the proceedings below and decides whether defense counsel’s
conduct was ineffective under Strickland, using reasonableness as a criterion of
both the deficiency and prejudicial effect prongs. 357 Second, relying on the state
court’s adjudication on the merits, the court must determine whether the state
court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1). Finally,
though not explicitly provided for by § 2254(d)(1), the Tenth Circuit will
examine the intervening district court opinion, particularly if the district court
has granted habeas corpus relief. At each of these levels, the courts, and the
individual judges within them, can conceivably disagree regarding this element
of “reasonableness”; no end exists to the individual observations and opinions
that will go into forming this assessment. The Mayes dissent highlights the
inherent flexibility and discretion that courts possess regarding both the
AEDPA standard and the underlying federal precedent. The deference that §
2254(d)(1) compels, combined with the reasonableness evaluations underlying
application of both that standard and the governing legal rule, will be doubly
complex. The dissenting opinion in Mayes demonstrates that although the
AEDPA standard is very high, its application in the courts of appeals depends
on various factors. Moreover, even if a habeas petitioner’s claim fits inside an
airtight theory or fact record, the § 2254(d)(1) proscription on de novo review
does not eliminate the subjectivity of each layer of analysis.
Besides these reasonableness determinations, the language of this and other
dissents addresses the presence of “speculation” in the Tenth Circuit opinions
and the right of the federal court to impose its analyses, which by necessity
355. Id. at 1289 (majority opinion) (“The Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel ‘a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)
(emphasis added))); id. at 1294 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court has
directed us to determine whether there is a reasonable probability . . . .”).
356. Id. at 1294 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
357. Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001); see also supra notes 11719 and accompanying text.
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often have hypothetical elements, on claims that state courts have denied after
a full adjudication on the merits. 358 A comparison of the discussion of the
federal courts’ speculation over the merits of a Strickland claim in Mayes359
with corresponding discussions in the dissenting opinions in Battenfield v.
Gibson 360 and Hooper v. Mullin 361 is instructive. In Mayes, the majority
remanded the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for an
evidentiary hearing because the Tenth Circuit could not determine from the
record why the defense counsel failed to examine mitigating evidence.362 The
court declared that it “simply cannot condone the administration of the death
penalty on the basis of speculation.” 363
But while in Mayes the Tenth Circuit avowedly could not rely on speculation
to determine whether the failure met Strickland’s deficiency prong, in
Battenfield, also a death penalty case, the court acknowledged its guesswork in
finding that counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating evidence had satisfied the
prejudice prong. 364 Rebutting the dissent’s assertion that the finding of
prejudicial effect was “nothing more than speculation,” 365 the Battenfield
majority defended its conclusion by arguing that (1) under the circumstances,
they had “little choice” but to speculate, and (2) the dissent must also be
speculating by finding a result to the contrary. 366 In addition, even though the
dissent in Hooper avoided using the term “speculative,” the majority’s
speculation about whether the failure met the deficient performance prong of
Strickland was certainly implied. 367 Essentially, the Hooper dissent argued that
the majority found defense counsel’s decision to place the second doctor’s
psychological report into evidence deficient because the decision ultimately
harmed the defendant. 368 The dissent presented an alternative scenario,
however, by asking whether counsel would still be deemed ineffective if the
state had not been able to rebut the report and the defense had one more
mitigating factor instead of one fewer.369 The Hooper dissent pointed out that
358. See infra notes 364-70 and accompanying text.
359. Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1289-90.
360. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1238 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
361. 314 F.3d 1162, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
362. Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1289-91.
363. Id. at 1289-90.
364. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1235 n.13.
365. Id. at 1238 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
366. Id. at 1235 n.13.
367. Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kelly, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
368. Id.
369. Id.
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“[t]he trial of a case is not a ‘do it by the numbers’ exercise, rather it is
uncertain and one uses what one has.” 370 These cases do not hold that overt
speculation about the deficiency prong of Strickland is inappropriate while
speculation in regard to prejudicial effect is proper. Rather, these open
references to the inherent speculation of federal court review of habeas corpus
petitions emphasize yet again how even when the Tenth Circuit finds grounds
for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), the court itself recognizes that in many
cases a majority could just as easily have denied relief to the state prisoner.
The rationale of these dissenting opinions is both intrinsically logical and in
agreement with the Tenth Circuit’s directives from Congress and the Supreme
Court. Although the explicit statements of this reasoning warranted a deviation
from the majority in Battenfield and Hooper, these statements bode poorly for
forthcoming habeas petitioners in the Tenth Circuit. In light of the tenuous line
between reasonableness and the lack thereof, the presumption these dissents
give to the appropriate use of federal precedent by state courts is both wellfounded and viable, as petitioners will likely see in future habeas cases.
These cases also indicate that the Tenth Circuit is most strongly inclined to
grant habeas relief because of an unreasonable application of Strickland for
deficient conduct that goes beyond a failure to investigate mitigating evidence.
In Miller v. Champion,371 Holmes v. McKune,372 and Paine v. Massie, 373 cases
where the defense attorneys failed to inform the defendant of a critical element
of his crime, 374 put the burden of producing alibi witnesses on the defendant, 375
and neglected to present a “key” element of the defense, 376 respectively, the
Tenth Circuit unanimously granted relief. But in Mayes, Battenfield, and
Hooper, cases that revolved around counsel’s failure to investigate and present
mitigating evidence, the Tenth Circuit split.377 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
lacks unity where the ineffective assistance of counsel centers on the
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, rather than on another,
potentially even more injurious form of deficient and prejudicial conduct.

370. Id.
371. 161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
372. No. 01-3004, 2003 WL 220496 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (unpub. op.).
373. 339 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003).
374. Miller, 161 F.3d at 1256.
375. Holmes, 2003 WL 220496, at *10.
376. Paine, 339 F.3d at 1202.
377. Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000) (2-1 decision); Battenfield v.
Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2001); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2002).
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2. Policy Issues at Stake: Comity, Finality, and Efficiency
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(d)(1) under the belief that
Congress wished to advance the principles of “comity, finality, and
federalism,” 378 and this understanding continues to shape AEDPA jurisprudence
today. Whether on the court of appeals level, as with the Tenth Circuit’s stated
policy of deferring to a state court’s result even absent explanation of the state
court’s rationale, 379 or from the Supreme Court, as seen in the Court’s
reprimand of a circuit court’s lack of deference in Woodford v. Visciotti,380
courts’ mutual recognition and respect is a recurring theme of habeas corpus,
especially post-AEDPA. This concept of comity is innately tied to cooperative
federalism concerns, as the perpetual tension of federal courts’ oversight of
state court decisions contrasts with the deference federal courts show state
courts, as well as with the finality one court must impart to another’s decisions.
A related consideration is recognizing the parity of state courts in their ability
and willingness to protect federal and constitutional rights.
Federal review of state court convictions is a contentious and complex
process that fosters resentment on both the state and federal levels. The
deference prescribed by AEDPA 381 has raised constitutionality issues, because
if the Constitution provides for the federal courts to have jurisdiction over all
cases in law and equity “arising under” federal law, legitimate arguments exist
that federal courts should be entitled to independently determine federal law.382
State court judges, in turn, do not necessarily appreciate federal habeas corpus
review’s implicit presumption of their incompetence, as a single federal judge
may overturn the decision of the state’s highest court.383 AEDPA’s standard
proves dauntingly difficult to apply. To find a state-court decision
not wrong but unreasonably wrong, assuming this distinction makes
sense in the first place, involves a highly fact-sensitive — and, it
378. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
379. Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).
380. 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam); see discussion supra Part III.B.3.
381. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (2-1 decision) (“AEDPA
thereby increases the degree of deference afforded to state court adjudications.”) (citations
omitted).
382. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 32.4, at 1462-97 (discussing the constitutional
problems that are present within § 2254(d)(1)’s treatment of federal habeas and the Williams
decision). President Clinton de-emphasized any constitutional problems with § 2254(d)(1)
possibly proscribing federal courts from “making an independent determination about ‘what the
law is’ . . . . I expect that the courts . . . will read [§ 2254(d)(1)] to permit independent Federal
court review of constitutional claims.” President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, supra note 53, at 721.
383. Flango & McKenna, supra note 71, at 238; see also Khandelwal, supra note 32, at 435.
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should be emphasized, also highly politically sensitive — judgment.
To render such a judgment will almost inevitably be to impugn the
integrity or competence of state-court judges. The federal judiciary
understandably hesitates to send this implicit message.384
The § 2254(d)(1) standard, and AEDPA as a whole, indicates that state
courts have more power in the habeas sphere than ever before. The heightened
influence of state courts, however, is tempered by the increased responsibility
required of state courts if they wish to keep their decisions intact. Section
2254(d)(1) mandates that a federal court center its examination of a habeas
claim on the state court’s analysis and the primary question of whether the state
arrived at the proper result.385 In this way, a federal court such as the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit builds its own analysis on the basis of
the state court’s prior adjudication of the claim. Though habeas relief is in a
period of constriction, the principle that a federal habeas court must look
beyond the language of the state court’s opinion into the merits of the
petitioner’s claim and the constitutionality of the sentence remains the
“touchstone” of federal habeas review. 386 Along with the other circuits, the
Tenth Circuit has strictly interpreted the AEDPA decisions of the Rehnquist
Court, “making it increasingly difficult for state prisoners to obtain habeas
relief. . . . While the net effects of [two Tenth Circuit decisions] may be small
by themselves, they are representative of a larger trend within the American
judiciary of attacking the foundations of the Great Writ.” 387
In addition, no clear line exists between a state court’s “reasonable”
application of federal law and an application that the federal court finds
objectively “unreasonable.” If a decision erroneously applies federal precedent,
it is an open question regarding “what increment of error renders that
misapplication unreasonable . . . . In practice, the answer at times must be:
whatever increment of error a federal habeas court finds necessary to justify its
decision to issue the writ in circumstances where justice manifestly requires
it.” 388 This decision to issue the writ at the federal level is not a common one,
as evidenced by the fact that the majority of habeas claims that reach the circuit
courts of appeals are disposed of via a dismissal or an affirmance of the district
court’s denial of relief. 389 Cases such as those from the Tenth Circuit discussed
above, however, demonstrate that such grants of relief under § 2254(d)(1) can
384. Sloane, supra note 3, at 618 (footnote omitted).
385. Id. at 634.
386. Id. at 632.
387. Barr, supra note 30, at 527 (referencing Herrera v. LeMaster, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.
2002); Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002)).
388. Sloane, supra note 3, at 618 (citation omitted).
389. Flango & McKenna, supra note 71, at 238.
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and do take place.390 The language that appears in both the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Tenth Circuit reflects the court’s hesitation to tread
on the decisions of the “best available thinking on the claim at bar — the prior
adjudication of that claim in state court.” 391
In Battenfield and Hooper, the dissents outlined convincing reasons for
disagreement with the majority’s declaration that the state court “unreasonably
applied” Strickland.392 Much of the rationale in these dissents is sound and
appears to fit within an overarching synthesis of deference to state courts and
restriction of habeas relief even beyond applicability to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In Battenfield, the dissent argued that the majority’s
grant of the writ was not consistent with the AEDPA standard of review
because the petitioner was only attempting to correct his own error in judgment
— that is, his knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to present mitigating
evidence.393 Because a defendant may waive this right394 and “[t]he failure to
present mitigating evidence is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel,”395
the dissent found that the Tenth Circuit overstepped its boundaries in perceiving
the attorney’s conduct as deficient.396 The dissent concluded that the Tenth
Circuit’s unwillingness to agree with the state court’s decision that the
defendant waived his right to present mitigating evidence was not in accordance
with the “proper, and properly limited, function of a federal habeas court in this
context,” which is “to insure that the death penalty is not imposed in violation
of the Constitution.” 397 Further, the dissent found that the majority violated the
deferential standard of review of § 2254(d)(1) because the state court was
“unassailably correct” in finding that Battenfield himself caused the mitigating
evidence not to be presented,398 and the majority’s speculation to the contrary
did not render the state court’s application of Strickland “unreasonable.” 399 The
tone of this opinion suggests that the Tenth Circuit’s disagreement with the state
court’s denial is a significant event. The state prisoner filing for federal habeas
relief can take from this opinion the knowledge that even if the Tenth Circuit
390. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at viii-xii, for a primer on how attorneys can increase
their chances of receiving habeas relief from generally unwilling federal judges.
391. Sloane, supra note 3, at 634 (citing Yackle, Primer, supra note 48, at 383).
392. Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1178-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kelly, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1236-39 (10th Cir. 2001)
(Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
393. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1236 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
394. Id. at 1238.
395. Id. at 1236 (citing Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1366 (10th Cir. 1994)).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1236, 1239 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993)).
398. Id. at 1238.
399. Id. at 1236-37.
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grants habeas corpus relief under § 2254(d)(1), the court does not take such an
action lightly and will hesitate before substituting its judgment for that of the
state courts.
The Hooper dissent again stresses the possible impropriety of finding a state
court application of Strickland unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) when the state
court has fully considered the entire sentencing proceeding and the facts on
record support the state court’s conclusion. 400 The majority opinion, though
referring to the circumscription AEDPA places on its habeas review 401 and the
Tenth Circuit’s presumption that counsel may have used a sound trial
strategy,402 found that the defense counsel made an uninformed choice rather
than choosing between two plausible alternatives.403 This characterization is the
most significant point of contention between the majority and the dissent; the
dissenting opinion argued that each of the counsel’s alternatives — to introduce
the medical witnesses and reports, or to not introduce them — was a “reasonable
strategic choice.”404 Therefore, under applicable Supreme Court precedent,
defense counsel’s actions were not ineffective simply because the defendant
would, in hindsight, have chosen a different route.405 The dissenting opinion,
while admitting that Hooper’s defense counsel did not make a full investigation,
nonetheless noted that § 2254(d)(1) requires a dual level of deference toward an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “[f]irst, only if [the federal court]
could conclude that the [state court’s] application of Strickland was objectively
unreasonable . . . is habeas relief on this claim warranted. . . . Second, under
Strickland, a reviewing court presumes that counsel’s decisions were an exercise
of reasonable professional judgment . . . .”406 The dissent focused on the
thorough attention the state court paid to the claim by “carefully [applying]
Strickland from start to finish”407 and noted that the Supreme Court mandated in
Visciotti that a state court’s determination be “‘given the benefit of the
doubt.’”408 The Hooper dissent echoes that of Battenfield in reflecting that the
comity and deference mandated by § 2254(d)(1) weigh heavily against the Tenth
Circuit finding a state court’s application of law “unreasonable” when one could
arguably see it as a “mere disagreement.”409
400. Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1178-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kelly, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
401. Id. at 1169 (majority opinion) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002)).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1171 & n.6.
404. Id. at 1179 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1178-79 (citation omitted).
407. Id. at 1180.
408. Id. (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
409. Id. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 1999) (Brorby, J.,

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/4

2005]

COMMENT

521

In contrast to AEDPA’s considerations of comity and finality, which the
Tenth Circuit’s majority and dissenting opinions explicitly contemplated,
AEDPA will likely have little effect on the efficiency of habeas corpus
litigation in the Tenth Circuit or anywhere else in the country. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that efficiency concerns will not affect the Tenth
Circuit’s perspective in addressing state prisoners’ petitions. Although
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, exhaustion requirement, and prohibition on
successive petitions 410 seemed bound to streamline habeas proceedings and
reduce the time between the filing and disposition of a habeas petition, much
of the delay for state prisoners actually occurs at the state level, where AEDPA
does not prescribe procedural changes. 411 No reason exists to believe that
AEDPA will significantly reduce the typical five-to-six-year period for a state
prisoner to complete both the state court direct appeal and the state postconviction relief processes.412 Only after the state prisoner has exhausted these
state requirements may he file a habeas petition in federal district court under
AEDPA. 413 From an efficiency standpoint, the extended period required for
exhaustion seems a more significant concern than the ten months that a typical
pre-AEDPA state prisoner’s federal habeas petition spent between filing and
disposition in a district court,414 or the six and a half months that a pre-AEDPA
federal habeas petition took to progress through a circuit court.415 Efficiency
of processing individual claims appears primed for greater alteration at the state,
rather than the federal, level. 416 The presumed delays associated with habeas
litigation, however, are apt to weigh heavily in the minds of the federal
dissenting), for an additional example of disagreement with the majority’s “misapplication” of
the AEDPA standard in granting habeas relief and discussion of the inherent speculation
required in habeas review. The dissent notes that the Tenth Circuit “is not to reevaluate the
evidence or second-guess the [state] court’s conclusion . . . . To delve beyond [analysis of
whether state court applied the correct rule of law] is to substitute this court’s speculation as to
the outcome of Petitioner’s trial . . . . I do not believe the AEDPA sanctions such interference.”
Id. at 1182.
410. BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 4.
411. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at 12-13.
412. Id. at 12 (nearly five years); Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 93
(six years).
413. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000); Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 93.
414. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS,
1980-96, at 7 tbl.7 (1997). A state prisoner’s death penalty habeas corpus petition, however,
averaged nearly twenty-two months to process in district court. Id.
415. Id. at 13 tbl.12. A state prisoner’s death penalty habeas corpus petition, however,
averaged over eleven months to process in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Id.
416. Considerations regarding individual petitions may seem more or less important,
depending on one’s viewpoint, in light of the increasing number of federal habeas petitions filed
by state prisoners since AEDPA’s enactment. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
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judiciary, even if the problem is more pressing at the state level. Although the
Tenth Circuit has not expressly discussed the concern for efficiency, in
combination with reluctance to upstage the state courts or to weaken the finality
afforded to the state courts’ decisions, these policy considerations signify an
escalating struggle for state prisoners seeking habeas relief.
3. AEDPA: For Better or for Worse?
Congress designed AEDPA not only to address the above jurisprudential
concerns, but also to reduce the volume of habeas litigation in the United States.
After the enactment of § 2254(d)(1) and the other deferential provisions of
AEDPA, however, a “sudden and unanticipated surge” 417 occurred in both the
rate and quantity of federal habeas petitions filed by state inmates. 418 Given the
federal judiciary’s requisite consideration of practicalities and externalities, this
increase in petitions forecasts a further reduction of a state habeas petitioner’s
already dwindling chances of obtaining relief from the Tenth Circuit. In 2000,
state prison inmates filed fifty percent more habeas petitions than in 1995.419
Although one may attribute a large increase in petitions filed in 1997 to the oneyear postconviction time limit required by AEDPA’s enactment in 1996, 420 the
reason for the continuing rate of increase in petitions is not clear. 421 In 1991,
the average number of habeas corpus petitions filed in the United States was
fourteen per thousand state prisoners.422 By 2000, however, the average number
of habeas petitions filed in the U.S. had increased to seventeen per thousand
state inmates.423 Although other factors are certainly at play in this substantial
increase of petitions, AEDPA’s major alteration of federal courts’ review is
unquestionably a cause of prisoners’ willingness to expend time and resources
417. Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 92.
418. BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 1, 4.
419. See id. at 2 tbl.2. In 2000, state prison inmates filed 21,345 habeas petitions compared
to 13,627 in 1995. Id.
420. Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation, supra note 18, at 3.
421. See generally Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 90, for a
somewhat negative prediction of the long-term effect of AEDPA (“[AEDPA] . . . is judged to
have virtually no impact.”). The article also notes the comparative success of another
congressional reform of state prisoner litigation, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
Pub. L No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66, which was also enacted in 1996. Id. at 94. The PLRA
was designed to reduce the number of state prisoner civil rights lawsuits, and thus far it has met
its goal more successfully than AEDPA. Id. at 96. Unlike habeas corpus petitions, after the
enactment of PLRA, both the rate at which state and federal prisoners filed civil rights petitions
and the number of those petitions filed decreased dramatically. BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra
note 60, at 4. AEDPA does not appear to have affected habeas corpus petitions filed by federal
prisoners. Id. at 7.
422. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at 8-9.
423. BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 1.
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on potentially fruitless applications for writs of habeas relief.424 One study
estimates that AEDPA’s passage has actually resulted in about one additional
habeas corpus petition filing each month for every 3400 state prisoners.425
The Tenth Circuit was no exception to the national increase of federal habeas
petitions filed by state prisoners. In 1991, when the average rate was fourteen
petitions per thousand state prisoners, Oklahoma and New Mexico were above
average, with seventeen petitions filed for every thousand state prisoners;
Wyoming also had an above-average filing rate with fifteen petitions per
thousand state prisoners.426 Colorado, Kansas, and Utah had below-average
filing rates, with eleven, eleven, and eight petitions per thousand state prisoners,
respectively.427 Yet by 2000, the states that comprise the Tenth Circuit had
increased the sum of their averages from seventy-nine petitions to one hundred
thirty per thousand state prisoners, even though Wyoming went from being
above the 1991 average of fourteen to below it in 2000, with nine petitions per
thousand state prisoners.428 Oklahoma and New Mexico remained above
average with twenty-six and sixty petitions per thousand state prisoners,
respectively. 429 Colorado, Kansas, and Utah maintained below-average filing
rates with sixteen, thirteen, and six petitions per thousand state prisoners,
respectively.430 Since the enactment of AEDPA, courts within the Tenth Circuit
have had more, not less, habeas litigation to address, and such an increase is an
unlikely incentive for the federal courts to buck the mandate of Congress and
actively seek to find “contrary to” or “unreasonable application” state court
decisions under § 2254(d)(1).
In addition to the doubts that these increases have raised regarding the
effectiveness of AEDPA in the face of the statute’s “almost complete lack of
success . . . in achieving [its] policy objectives,” 431 an argument exists that the
extremely high standard AEDPA installed was unnecessary. The year before
AEDPA was enacted, the federal appellate courts disposed of over 14,000 state
and federal prisoner petitions, but in 94% of those cases the appellate courts
simply dismissed the case or affirmed the district court’s ruling.432 In addition,
even though newspaper headlines often exclaim that death penalty litigation and
424. Id. at 5.
425. Id. at 7. The increase in the number of petitions resulting from the increased rate of
filing, however, was supplemented by the increase on account of the major ongoing rise in state
prison populations. Id.
426. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at 8-9.
427. Id.
428. BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 3 tbl.2.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 105.
432. SCALIA, supra note 414, at 12.
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postconviction appeals are tying up court dockets, both pre- and post-AEDPA
death sentences accounted for only about 1% of all federal habeas corpus
petitions, calling into question any presumption that these habeas petitions take
a disproportionate amount of resources to resolve.433
Despite AEDPA being judged as having “virtually no impact” on achieving
its objective of restricting habeas corpus petitions, 434 “many knowledgeable
observers, including [the late] U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, are optimistic that [AEDPA is] having [its] intended effects.” 435
Nevertheless, federal courts’ reluctance to grant writs of habeas corpus 436 will
correspondingly increase with the greater number of federal habeas petitions
filed. Indeed, the higher number of habeas petitions filed, together with the
perpetual shortage of funds and resources in the federal courts,437 will likely
strengthen the circuit courts’ resolve to preserve their resources, give the state
and district courts their due respect, and deny the majority of federal habeas
corpus petitions by way of the safe harbor in the standard of § 2254(d)(1).
These concerns perhaps signify hesitance in the Tenth Circuit to find that state
courts applied clearly established federal law unreasonably or in a manner
contrary to precedent. Even if courts do not explicitly mention this external
factor of judicial economy, practical considerations doubtless will only heighten
the circuit court’s prescribed deference to the state courts.
VI. Conclusion
Nearly ten years after AEDPA’s enactment, it remains to be seen whether
AEDPA’s placement of trust in the state courts will have its desired effect of
constricting habeas corpus litigation and speeding the pace of enforcement of
pending death sentences. Today, a state prisoner who believes he is
unconstitutionally being held in custody has an arduous task ahead with no
guarantee of success. 438 Federal courts grant only a small fraction of habeas
433. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 224, at 13; BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 3
tbl.2. Contra Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 826 (1995) (arguing that the capital habeas process incurs enormous
financial and emotional costs and time delays without proportional benefits to the justice
system).
434. Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 59, at 90.
435. Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
436. See discussion supra Part I.
437. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 YEAR-END REP. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY
pt. 2, at 2-3 (discussing the federal judiciary’s budget crisis and necessary employee and service
reductions).
438. A state prisoner’s pessimism can spring from considerations beyond AEDPA:
Habeas corpus is not like a direct appeal, in which one presents the relevant facts
and legal arguments in a well-written brief and relies upon the merits of the issues
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corpus petitions.439 The Tenth Circuit is aiding Congress’s purpose of
restricting habeas corpus by reserving issuance of the writ to situations where
legal scholars and citizens alike can see that the state court applied binding
federal precedent in a way that does not redress constitutional error. A state
prisoner who appeals the denial of federal habeas relief in the Tenth Circuit is
unlikely to be successful. Nevertheless, a chance exists that his claim will fit
into the narrow line of cases where relief was granted, or that he will be able to
carve out a new, contracted tunnel to habeas relief. In addition, a petitioner
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel may be granted a more attentive ear
at the bench if his claim extends beyond counsel’s failure to investigate
mitigating evidence. Even when the Tenth Circuit has granted relief on account
of a state court’s unreasonable application of law, the significant subjectivity
and speculation required in analyzing habeas claims under § 2254(d)(1)
indicates that these grants could almost as easily have been denials. Because
of the congressional mandate of AEDPA, the federal courts’ long-standing
respect for state courts’ decisions, and the federal judiciary’s practical concerns,
the already difficult task of obtaining habeas corpus relief in the Tenth Circuit
under § 2254(d)(1) is bound to become ever more challenging for state
prisoners.
Elizabeth J. Barnett

to carry the day. A different mind-set is required. Even though many grounds for
relief will be entitled to de novo review and plenary consideration, federal judges
may be predisposed to deny relief . . . . Therefore, the state court's resolution of
constitutional claims may be received in federal court with a practical, if not legal,
presumption of correctness.
Blume & Voisin, supra note 7, at 275.
439. Flango & McKenna, supra note 71, at 238, 259; see supra note 432 and accompanying
text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005

